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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Paul R. Baier*

I. EQUAL PROTECTION
Judge Irving Goldberg's opm1on in Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas,1 which addresses mental retarda
tion and equal protection, reflects the heroism of a hundred years
ago and the same rock-like sense of justice that makes a judge
great. All who labor in the Fifth Circuit, bench and bar alike, can
he proud of this one.
The Fifth Circuit, in Cleburne Living Center, held that classi
fications based on mental retardation are "quasi-suspect."2 "Dis
crimination against the mentally retarded is likely to reflect deep
seated prejudice. They have been subjected to a history of unfair
and often grotesque mistreatment,"3 said Judge Goldberg. Men
tally handicapped people have been segregated in remote, stigma
tizing institutions; they possess relatively little political power;
their condition is immutable; popular fears and uncertainty about
them abound:' Indeed, the Third Circuit has opined that "[t]he
mentally retarded may well be a paradigmatic example of a dis
crete and insular minority for whom the judiciary should exercise

•

Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. Member

of the Louisiana Bar and the Bar of the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals. Edi
tor, MR. JusTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE ME MOIRS OF HUG O L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK
(Random House 1986).
The author wishes to thank Mr. Gerald Walton, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, the University of Mississippi, for his historical diggings on the antifraternity agita
tion during Chancellor Kincannon's administration at Ole Miss. And, as always, the author
is deeply indebted to Charlotte Melius, Madeline Hebert, and Isabel Wingerter, all excellent
law librarians, for their friendship and help with the books.
l. 726 F'.2d 191 (5t h Cir. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
2. [W]e hold that mental retardate� constitute a "quasi-suspect" class; and, there
fore, we test the ordinance according to the "intermediate" level of scrutiny estab
lished by the Supreme Court. Because the city has failed to prove that the ordinance
substantially furthers a significant governmental interest, we hold that the ordinance
viol ates the Equal Protection Clause.

72 6 F.2d at 193.
3.

Id. at 197.

4.

Id. at 197-98.
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special solicitude."6 The reference, of course, is to Carolen_e Prod
.
ucts' footnote four ,6 which has achieved a measured followmg over
hat all his
the years as documented in l� st year's Sy"!posium 7
:
.
.
preJud1ce, political
means is that the combination of h1stor1cal

�

�

powerlessness, and immutability "calls for heightened scruti ny of
classifications discriminating against the mentally retarded."s
Heightened scrutiny is neither the strictest, generally lethal stan
dard of review, nor the mildest standard, the test of "mere ration
ality. "9 Instead, it is an intermediate level established by the Su
preme Court and employed by the Fifth Circuit to test the Texas
City ordinance.
At this point I'm sure the usual formulae of equal protection
review are rolling around in the reader's head. Formulaic analysis,
however, sometimes gets you into trouble, as we shall see in a
moment.
And what was the disadvantaging classification? The city of
Cleburne required a special use permit before the mentally re
tarded could live together in a group home. However, the city did
not require such permits for other groups, such as fraternities . The
panel responded accordingly to this restriction: "Because the city
has failed to prove that the ordinance substantially furthers a sig
nificant governmental interest, we hold that the ordinance violates
the Equal Protection Clause."1° None of the city's asserted goals,
such as avoiding traffic congestion, was substantially served by the
ordinance. As a result, the ordinance was deemed unconstitutional
on its face and as applied.11 Moreover, the "standardless require
ment" of a special permit was "both vastly overbroad and vastly
underinclusive,"12 a damning facial flaw according to the court. In
addition, nothing in the record indicated that mentally retarded
5. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 163 n.35 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated and
remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

6. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), especially the
.
t�ird paragraph of the note, which speaks of "prejudice against
discrete and insular minori

ties" as a "special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation o f t hose politi cal
proces_ses ordinarily to be relied upon. to protect minoritie
s, and which may call for a corre
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry."

7. See Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitu
tional Law ' 30
22 (1984).
·

8.

9.

10.

Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 198.
Id. at 193.
Id.

11.

Id. at 200.

12.

Id.

Lov L REV 6 19 621.

.

.

'
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per son s livin g i n group homes are more disruptive or dangerous
than oth er people. Cleburne's ordinance was bad on its face:
There is too great a po tential for blanket discrimination, fueled by
the very fears and prejudices that drove neighbors in this case to
petition the City Council against the Featherson Home. We cannot
sanction such unbridled discretion in dealing with a class that has
suffered a history of mistreatment and political impotence. 18

This is a bold stroke from a court whose canvassing of equality
under the law has made it noble. This is high praise to be sure. But
the court deserves it. Where else can these victims of public
prejudice take refuge if not under the aegis of judges like Irving
Goldberg?
Testing Cleburne's ordinance under intermediate scrutiny, the
panel also condemned the ordinance "as applied," thereby overrul
ing the City Council's administrative decision to deny a permit in
this specific instance. After reviewing each of the factors involved
in the Council's decision, Judge Goldberg concluded that "none of
the proferred reasons for denying the Featherston permit substan
tially served an important government interest."1' For example,
the City argued that the residents of the Featherston Home would
be too crowded. But what about fraternity brothers squeezing to
gether? "The City never justifies its apparent view that other peo
ple can live under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally re
tarded persons cannot."1& And Cleburne's argument "that the
[Featherston] Home would be in a 500 year flood plain seems
somewhat strained. "18 With commendable restraint, the panel
noted that "[t]hough the safety of the r esidents is important, the
danger of a flood every five hundred years is not particularly
great."11 As to the negative attitudes of adjacent property owners,
Judge Goldberg responded bluntly: "The prejudices and fears of
neighbors are not in themselves legitimate bases for discrimina
tio n."18 Otherwise, "prejudice becomes its own excuse."19
Clebu rne Living Center is a courageous opinion from a protec
tive panel of judges. It reflects the shielding role of courts under
13.
14.
15 .
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 20 1.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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recalJs the efforts of earl ier judicial
our constitutional system. It
judicial c o?1 missio� , � ought to pro
heroes who, by virtue of their
gs a gamst pre1ud1c e and p ublic
tect weak and helpless human bein
excitement.
Rehearing en bane was denied by the full Fifth Circuit, but
only by the thinnest of margins, eight t o seven.20 Judge Garwood
thought the Cleburne panel had gone too far, and he said so in his

straight-forward fashion: "The mentally retarded present a wholly
distinct situation. They are materially different from the rest of
society, and are so as a result of their class-defining characteris
tics.2" 1 As a result, Judge Garwood thought ill-advised the panel's
novel rule that classification based on mental retardation is "quasi
suspect." State regulations inevitably distinguish between the re
tarded and others. To strike them down on the basis of the same
test used to judge distinctions based on gender "constitutes ...a
major and unwarranted extension of federal judicial power, to the
substantial prejudice both of the judicial function and the princi
ples of federalism."22 Judge Garwood's c onclusion was a flag to the
Supreme Court: "The unprecedented rule announced by the panel
tells us, I fear, significantly more about the institutional powers of
the federal judiciary than it does about the proper state treatment
of the retarded. 2" 3

It is probable that Judge Garwood's cautionary remark influ
enced the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.Justice White, writ
ing for six justices, rejected the panel's holding that mental retar
dation is a quasi-suspect classification.2' The majority's reasoning
mirrors Judge Garwood's thinking. The mentally retarded are dif
ferent; they have "distinguishing characteristics relevant to inter
ests the state has the authority to implement."11
2 Furthermore, Jus
tice White urged caution, not judicial innovation:

Ho� this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is
a difficult and often a technical
matter, very much a task for legisla20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 833 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitt
ed).
Id. at 834.

Id.

City 0� CI�burne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living C enter 105 S. Ct. 3249 ( 1985), aff'g in
part and vacating in part, 726 F.2d
191 (5th Cir. 1984): " We conclude for several reasons
h the Court of Appeals err
.
t at
..
ed m hoId'mg mental retardation a quasi-suspect class1f
icat1on
�
' tor
.
.
c allmg
a more
·

exacting standard 0f JUd'1c1'al
review than is normally accorded econ omic
.
and soc1'al 1eg1s
. 1ation." 105 S. Ct. at 3255-&6
.
25. 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
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tors guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill
informed opinions of the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably
involves substantive judgments about legis lative decisions, and we
doubt that t he predicate for such judicial oversight is present where
the classification deals with mental retardation. 11
Moreover, national and state legislative efforts to aid the men
tally retarded "negate[] any claim that the mentally retarded are
politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to at
tract the attention of the lawmakers. "17 The Court dismissed the
panel's conclusion of facial unconstitutionality because the Court
would not "presume that any given legislative action, even one that
disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that

the Constitution will not tolerate. "18 The Court held that the
proper way to remedy invidious discrimination against the re
tarded did not lie i n creating a "new quasi-suspect classification
and subject[ing] all governmental action based on that classifica

tion to more searching evaluation. "19 Rather, it suffices to apply
the rational basis tes t of old: "To withstand equal protection re
view, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded
and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose."30

From this point forward, the Supreme Court followed the
2 6. Id. at 3256.
27. Id. at 3257.
28. Id. at 3258.

Because menta l retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately
take into account in a wide range of decisions, and because both state and federal
governments have recently committed themselves to 888isting the retarded, we will

Id.

not presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded
indivi duals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.

29. Id.
30. Id. "This standard," said the Supreme Court's majority opinion, "atfords govem

?1ent the latitude necessary both to pursue polici es designed to 888ist the retarded in realiz 
ing their full potential , and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the

retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner." Id. The Court cautioned, however,

that refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely
unprotected from
individious discrimination:
The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.Furthermore, some
objectives-such
as "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group"-are
not legiti mate
state interests. Beyond that, the mentally retarded, like others, have
and retain their
substant ive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated
equally by the
law.
Id. (ci tations
omitted).
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Fifth

Circuit, agreeing with the panel's conclusion

that the

Cleburne ordinance was unconstitutional as applied: "Because in
our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing
that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the
city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment bel o w insofar as
it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case. "31 This was
at least a half-victory for the panel.
Some students of equal protection may find it strange that the
Cleburne ordinance failed the mere rationality test. They would
say the scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court in fact seems
stricter than that usually associated with the "champagne prom 
" 2 of rationality review. Doubtless there is some truth to the
ise 3
allegation.But this is not the place to discourse at length on the
right test to apply to classifications disadvantaging the m entally
retarded.Formulae are important, to be sure, if we are t o have
equal justice under law. Nevertheless, a court's sense of j ustice
may have a good deal more to do with constitutional adjudication
than is customarily acknowledged in the reports. Cleburne Living

Center proves that magic formulae are not good substitutes for ju
dicial judgment, especially when it comes to guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. This is a lesson that too few students, I'm
afraid, ever grasp.

31.

Id. at 3259.

32. "Old equal protection, it is fair to say, was no protection at all; the rational basis
test was a mere champagne promise." Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional Law,
30 LOY. L. REv. 619 (1984). Dissenting in the Cleburne case, Justice Marshall, joined by

Justices Brennan and Blackmun, thought the majority's "rational basis" rationale p uzzling:
"The Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational basis grounds
and disclaims that any
thing special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place
. Yet Cleburne's ordinance
surely would be valid under the traditional rational basis
test applicable to econo mic and
commercial regulation." 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part, disse nting in
part). Most second-year law students who have studied
the law of equal protection would
probably agree with Justice Marshall's observ
ation:
Cleb�n�'s ordinance is invalidated only after
being subjected to precisely the sort of
.
probmg mqwry associated with heightened
scrutiny. To be sure the Court does not
label its handiwork heightened scrutiny
, and perhap s the met od employed must
ere�fter be called "second order" rational
basis review rather than "heightened scru
tiny. . But owever abelled, the rationa
l basis test invoked today is most assuredly
not the rational basis test of Williamson
u. Lee Optical
. . and [its] progeny.

�

h

�

�

.

Id. at 3264 (citations omitted).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Public Employment

Ardith McPherson, like so many public employees of late,
owes her continued government employment to the sensitivity of
the Fifth Circuit and to Judge Tate, who reversed a summary judg
ment against her. McPherson

v.

Rankin38 is one of many public

employee lawsuits requiring judges to apply the burgeoning law
addressing the free speech of public employees, in particular, the

"Pickering balancing test":u "To arrive at a balance between the
interests of the [employee] , as a citizen, in commenting upon mat
ters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an em
ployer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."311
McPherson was fired from her job as a deputy constable for a
remark she made after hearing of the attempted assassination of
President Reagan. "[l] f they go for him again, I hope they get
him,"36 she told a co-worker at lunch. The remark capped what
McPherson thought was a private tete-a-tete expressing opposition
to the President's policies on welfare and unemployment. The trial
court thought McPherson's remark unprotected as a matter of law,
but the appeals panel identified several issues of material fact pre
cluding summary judgment.
For example, a dispute focused on whether McPherson in
tended her remark to be taken seriously. Constable Rankin
thought she was serious; McPherson testified, "I didn't mean any
thing by it."37 Obviously, a crucial fact is in dispute here and sum
mary judgment is not appropriate. As the panel points out, "[t]he
issue of McPherson's intent is relevant to the present inquiry be
cause it is imperative that a court's characterization of speech as
political expression, for purposes of First Amendment protection,
73 6 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1984).
Picke ring v. Board of Education, 3 91 U.S.56 3 (1968). The Court held that a public
employee does not
relinquish first amendment rights to comment on matters of public inter
est by virtue of gov
ernment em ployment. The Court recognized that the state's interests "as
an empl o yer in r
egulating the speech of its employees . . . differ significantly from those it
J>Osse sses in connection
with regulation of speech of the citizenry in general." Id. at 568.
Judge Higginboth
am's keen dissection of the Picke ring bal ance in Gonzales v. Benavides,
712 F.2d 142 (5th
Cir. 1983) is required reading on this subject in the Fifth Circuit.
35. 391 U.S. at 568.
36. 736 F. 2d at 177 .
37. Id. n.3.
33.
34.

Loyola Law Review
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be predicated upon consideration of its 'content, form, and con
text.' "38 The context of the speech-including an e�ployee's mo
tive in making it-is especially material when pubhc employees
speak privately on the job. 39 If McPherson truly meant her remark
a form of political hyperbole, not as advocacy of harm t o the

as

President, then the Pickering balance would seem to weigh i n her
favor. But first, as Judge Tate makes abundantly clear, the true
facts must be determined after trial on the merits. Summary judg
ment is simply too blunt an instrument in these public employee,
free speech cases. Balancing the competing interests requires a ra
zor, not a meat axe, even in the face of a public employee's blunt
tongue.
By way of contrast, the trial court in Solis v. Rio Grande City
Independent School"0 allowed the jury to decide whether the polit
ical activities of Amanda Solis and three other school teach
ers-their support for opposition school board candidates-was a
substantial and motivating factor in the refusal of the school board
to give these teachers their usual summer jobs. The jury answered
"Yes" to special interrogatories and awarded plaintiffs $5,900 for
lost wages and $100,000 for "humiliation, embarrassment and con
cern" flowing from the violation of their constitutional rights. Of
course the first amendment protects public employees' campaign
ing activities as a form of protected speech, although the precise
scope of the protection-the McBee balance in the Fifth Cir
cuit-remains cloudy.41

Solis v. Rio Grande City Independent School turns on the
second prong of the Mt. Healthy two-part test; that is, "whether
the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision as to [plaintiffs'] reemploy38.

Id. at 178-79 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
O n this point, Ju ge Tate refers the reader to McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Texas,
730 : .d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (balancing
factors include employee's motives
.
m vo1cmg the expressions at issue and their contex
t). 736 F.2d at 179.
40. 734 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. (1984).
41. See McBee discussed in Baier, Fifth Circuit
Symposium: Constitu tional Law, 30
Lov. L REv. 619, 630-39 (1984). For criticism
o
the
McBee
f
balancing act, from the pen of a
.
rceptive student, see Note, M Bee v. im
ogg
County
:
On
Balance A Risky Business, 45
�
L: R v. 109� (19 5). The Eighth Circuit's approach d iffers from
the law of the Fifth
C.ircmt: . The Pickering balan cmg test
.
need not be used m determining whether the first
dment pro cts political affiliation." Barnes
v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 506 (8th Cir.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2022 (1985).
Undo ubtedly, given the conflict ing a ppro aches
among t e ederal circuits, the Suprem
e Court will eventu ally have to return to this murky
area o f the 1 aw.

�

:92

�

.

·

�:�

�

' c�\

� !f

�

�

·
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men t even in the absence of the protected conduct.""2 As the Fifth
Circuit has said, "[the Mt. Healthy charge] is succinct and clear."43
And yet the trial court "submitted no special question [to the jury]
which under any reading could encompass the second inquiry of
Mt. Healthy or permit a definitive answer on that question by the
jury."44 The defendants requested an interrogatory on this point,
thereby preserving their objection to the trial court's failure to
charge on the second prong.
Judge Brown had no alternative but to reverse, notwithstand
ing that "this Court is particularly chary of disturbing a jury ver
dict rendered after a full trial.""6 The opinion is a loud admonition
to the trial bench. A proper Mt. Healthy charge is simple. "It
should be given,""6 no ifs, and's, or hut's about it. And Judge
Brown's opinion also sounds a cautionary note to the trial bar who
litigate these political retaliation cases: labor over your proposed
instructions carefully, lest an appellate court rob you of a $100,000
jury verdict.
Remanding the case for a new trial, the panel announced that
"because factors [1] and [2] of Mt. Healthy are inseparably inter
twined, both should be retried. "47 The court also hinted that the
jury's quantum may have been too great: "Of course, damages may
be awarded for embarrassment or mental distress resulting from a
deprivation of constitutional rights. Absent proof of actual injury,
however, only n ominal damages may be awarded for violation of
constitutional rights."48 Although plaintiffs testified to varying de
grees of depression, feeling "letdown" and "very, very sad," the
panel emphasized that "[n]o proof of any physical manifestations
of plaintiffs' asserted depression and embarrassment was given at
trial."49 Since the court reached out to discuss the issue of "Exces
sive Damages," one suspects that the reviewing judges were un42. 734 F.2d at 246 (quoting Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977 )). The
first prong requires plaintiff to prove "that his conduct was con
stitu tiona lly protec ted, and that 'this conduct was a "substantial factor" or, to put it in

othe r word s, that it was a "motivating factor" in the Board's decision not to rehire him.' "
734 F.2d at 246 (quoting M
t. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287) (footnote omitted by Fifth Circuit).
4 3. Bueno v. City of
Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 497 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rubin, J., specially
concurring).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

734 F.2d at 249.
Id. at 24 5.

Id. at 250.
Id . (footnote omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 251.

[Vol. 31:639
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happy with the jury's generosity. 6 0

;

The jury was properly charged on both prongs of th Mt.
.
.
Healthy test in Wells v. Hico Independent School Di strict, 1 an
other school teacher, refusal-to-rehire case. The jury returned a
verdict on first amendmen t grounds in plaintiff's favor and the ap
pellate court affirmed, finding "at least some evidence that a mate
rial portion of [ the teacher's] speech pertained to matters of public
concern, and did not relate only to matters of exclusively personal
interest, within the rule of Connick. "62 The teachers involved had
spoken out in favor of the federally funded "Right to Read" pro
gram, a subject of debate in the community.
Defendants' failure to move for a directed verdict in the dis
trict court left the appellate court with only the narrowest respon
sibility: "Because appellants wholly failed to in any manner pre
serve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to support plaintiffs'
First Amendment claims, we must affirm the jury verdict in this
respect if there is any evidence to support it."113 Applying this "dis
tinctly limited standard of review,"6" the court found "at least
some evidence that this protected speech of plaintiffs was a moti
vating factor in their nonrenewal. Nor does the evidence conclu
sively show that nonrenewal would have occurred absent such pro
tected speech."H The teachers were ordered reinstated with back
pay, although the award of punitive damages against individual
Board members was reversed since "there is absolutely no evidence
that the individual B oard members acted with malice or with a
'reckless or callous disregard' for plaintiffs' [first amendment]
rights in this connection. "116
B.

Medical Staff Privileges

Daly v. Sprague67 returned to the Fifth Circuit this term. A
50. Id. at 250. The issue of "Excessive Damages" was separately stated and separately
considered at the conclusion of Judge Brown's opinion.
51.
52.

736 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 111 (1985).
736 .F.2d at 249 (emphasis in original) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
53. 736 F.2d a t 249 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 250.
55.

Id. at 249.

56. Id. at 259, applying the rule of Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983), that only a
"reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff' s rights, as well as intentional violations of
federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury's consideration of the appropriateness of
punitive damages."
57.

742 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1984). For the first round, see Daly

v.

Sprague, 675 F.2d 716

Constitutional Law
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state-operated teaching hospital suspended Dr. Daly's clinical staff
privileges and denied him communication with his hospital pa
tients. On appeal a second time, the court curtly rejected the doc
tor's first amendment challenge stating that "[i]t is beyond dispute
that a state operated hospital has the right, and the duty, to regu
late the conduct of its physicians. Limitations on professional con
duct necessarily affect the use of language and association; accord
ingly, reasonable restraints on the practice of medicine and
professional actions cannot be defeated b y pointing to the fact that
communication is involved."118 A doctor's intention to speak and
associate with his hospital patients "is clearly subsumed within
and subservient to the regulation of medical practitioners in state
hospitals."119 Dr. Daly was not forced to relinquish his first amend
ment rights

as

a private citizen, "[o]nly those state clinical privi

leges extended to him as a physician-employee of the medical
center. "80 In rejecting the physician's claim, the court indicated
that there are "substantial limits"61 placed on the extent to which
a public hospital's decisions may be restrained on first amendment
grounds. In a cautious remark, the Fifth Circuit noted that "courts
should not intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in
the daily operation of [public hospital systems] unless basic consti
tutional values are directly and sharply implicated."6 2
And in another case involving a suspended physician, Davis v.
West Community Hospital,63 the Fifth Circuit held that the
speech in question was unprotected as a matter of law, because it
concerned only personal grievances outside the coverage of the first
amendment. The Davis panel adopted the Ninth Circuit's formula
tion of the Connick v. Meyers64 inquiry as follows:
Speech by public employees may be characterized

as not

of "public

(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983), discussed in Baier, Fifth Circuit Sympo
sium: Constitutional Law, 29 Lov. L. REv. 647, 674-76 (1983).
58.

742 F.2d at 898.

59.

Id. at 899

60.

Id. (footnote omitted).

61.

Id. n.5 (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982)).
742 F.2d at 899 n.5.

62.

Pico further illustrates that courts should not intervene in the resolution of conflicts
which arise in the daily operation of school systems unless basic constitutional values
are directly and sharply implicated. The same considerations appear to apply to the
univeraity medical center in view of the state's extensive authority to regulate the
practice of medicine.
63. 755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985).
64. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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concern" when it is clear that such sp eech deals with individual per
sonnel disputes and grievances and t hat the information would be of
no relevance to the publ ic's evaluation of the performance of govern

mental agencies. On the other hand, speech that concerns ''issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to en able the
members of society" to make informed decisions about the operation
of their government merits the highest degree of first amendment
protection. 611

Dr. Davis's in-house complaints about his co-workers and hospital
6
administrators, " [ c ]onsidered in the ir entire context, "6 did not
"fall under the rubric of matters o f public concern but, instead,
.
terest. "67
falls under the banner of matters o f pure persona 1 m
Hence a jury verdict for Dr. Davis on his first amendment claim
was reversed as a matter of law.
III.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS

Public e mployment impli�ates two constitutionally protected

substantive interests: "property" defined by reference to state
law,68 and "liberty " defined by the federal judiciary. 69 Wells v.
65. 755 F.2d at 461 (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.
1983)) (citations omitted by Fifth Circuit).
66. 755 F.2d at 461.
67. Id.
68.
(1972):

Per Stewart, J., for the Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577

Property interests, of course, arc not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Some commen tators question the idea that constitutional "property" should be determined
exclusively by reference to state law. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 COR
NELL L. REV. 405, 434-39 (1977). Regardless of what one thinks of the idea that property
interests are not created by the Constitution, certainly the Fifth Circuit is obliged to follow
the law-however well or poorly the Supreme Court declares it. And the Fifth Circuit has
fallen in line on this matter of constitutional property: "[W]e look to state law for the exis
tence of a property interest." Daly v. Sprague, 675 F.2d 716, 727 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1047 (1983).
69. The locus classicus, of course, is Mr. Justice McReynolds's ex cathedra declara
tion in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citation omitted):
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
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Hico Independent School District70 is a good example of public

employee claims of abridgment of property and liberty interests.
The school teachers involved worked under one-year contracts of
employment which were not renewed. The jury found that plain
tiffs' property interests had been violated since the school district
had failed to follow its own grievance procedures in refusing t o re
new plaintiffs' contracts.
Plaintiffs claimed that the District 's grievance policies "cre
ated an expectation of continued employment amounting to a
property right," relying on the Supreme Court's recognition that
state institutions through their own internal employment policies
may "give rise to a state law implied contractual right based on
'mutually explicit understandings.' "71 This is a fine legal theory
which captured the jury's fancy. However, in due course, the ap
pellate court rescued the School District, holding that the facts
simply did not fit any property interest theory of the case. Accord
ing to the panel, the School District's grievance policies relate
solely to processing employee grievances; they do not limit the Dis
trict in its relations with its employees. "This policy says nothing
about either discharge or nonrenewal of any employee. "72 Hence,
"it is plain, we believe, that the School District's grievance policy
could not and did not implicate a property interest on the part of
Mrs. Braune and Mrs. Wells. "73
Furthermore, under Texas law, which the Hico panel followed
as controlling, the School District operated under fixed term con
tracts for its teachers, not continuing contract provisions that cre
ate tenure for those Texas school districts which opt for it. The
Fifth Circuit has ruled that school districts not adopting Texas'
continuing contract law cannot create an implied contractual right
to reemployment by their internal policies and practices.74 Said
Judge Garwood on· appeal, "it is wholly unreasonable to read en
tirely by implication into these policies . . . a purportedly binding
restriction on the otherwise plenary p ower of the School Board to
elect not to renew plaintiffs' contracts at the expiration of their
conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

736 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 252 & n.12 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 60 1 ( 1972)).
736 F.2d at 254 (emphasis in original).
·
Id. (emphasis in original).
Burris v. W illis Indep. School Dist., 713 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1983).
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terms."76 As a matter of law, therefore, the district c ourt erred in
submitting the property interest theory to the jury. Judge

? a�

wood's decision on this aspect of the case is as sound as it is
straightforward, although plaintiffs' counsel should be commended
for what was a good try below.
Focusing on the liberty aspect of Hico reveals a strange affair
indeed. The jury, obviously sympathetic to the teachers involved,
also found that plaintiffs' liberty interests were abridged, although
they were never told "what is necessary in order for that to be
so."76 It is possible that the jury may have thought that nonre
newal alone was enough to invoke a liberty interest. Judge Gar
wood's restrained reaction on appeal-his quiet correction of glar
ing error-is commendable. Doubtless he is right to say that "there
is a general public commonsense perception that t h e loss of one's
job can be stigmatizing in itself."77 However, this result is insuffi
cient to raise a protected liberty interest. "[T]he law requires more
than mere nonrenewal to find a liberty deprivation .... "78 Be
cause the common sense of the public is not the law of the Consti
tution, at least not in this area of public employee "liberty," Judge
Garwood's opinion cautions the trial bench to instruct the jury
carefully on the legal elements of a liberty deprivation. If not, re
versal is mandated.
And what are the necessary elements of a liberty claim? Judge
Garwood's recitation is a tight compendium of controlling law that
lawyers and law students would d o well to heed. First, the em
ployee must show that his employer has brought false charges
against him that "might seriously damage his standing and as
sociations in his community."79 Nonrenewal alone "is not such

a

blight upon his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity as to
constitute a deprivation of liberty."80 The required stigma-be75. 736 F.2d at 255. The court continu ed:
Our Burris decision controls. Neither the referenced policies nor any other evidence
justifies the conclusion that plaintiffs had, under Texas law, any property interest in

their teaching positions extending beyond t h e one-year terms of their contracts with
this School District which operated under t h e statutory nontenure system. Because

Id.

there was insufficient evidence of a property interest the district court
erred in sub'
mitting the property interest theory to the jury.
76.
77.

Id. at 258 (emphasis in original).
Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S 564, 573 (1972).
Dennis v. S & S Consol. Rural High School Dist., 577 F.2d 338,
340 (5th Cir. 1978).

80.
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yond nonrenewal-"must be imposed by the state in connection
with its denial of a right or status previously recognized by state
law,"81 although "loss of a property interest (such as tenured em
ployment) is not required. "82 The specific kinds of state rights or
status the court demands is not exactly clear. The required stigma
tization must be "in or as a result of the discharge process."83 The
aggrieved employee must show that the governmental agency has
made or is likely to make its charges public "in any official or in
tentional manner, other than in connection with the defense o f [re
lated legal] action."84 Also, "the employee must not have received a
meaningful hearing to clear his name. "86 And finally, " [t] he
charges must be false. "88
Nothing in the evidence in Hico linked the Board to any stig
matizing charges against plaintiffs. "There is no evidence that the
Board members or the District administration did anything in this
regard other than listen to the grievance o f the other teachers;
nothing purporting to constitute Board or District administration
action on this grievance is shown to have occurred."87 Further
more, the jury was not instructed, as it should have been, that any
stigmatizing "charges" against the plaintiffs "must have been made
or approved by the defendants and made (or likely to be made)
public by them."88 These errors required a reversal and remand for
a new trial on the libert y interest claims.
Judge Jolly would have reversed outright, finding no evidence
at all supporting plaintiffs' liberty theory of the case.89 It appeared
to Judge Jolly "a manifest miscarriage of justice to require the de
fendants to submit to a second trial of a claim in support of which
the plaintiffs produced no evidence at the first trial."90 There is
81.
82.
83.

Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d at 256.

Id.

Wells

v.

Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 676 {5th Cir. 1983) (citing S & S Consol. Rural

High School Dist., 577 F.2d at 341 ) .

Kaprelian v . Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133, 1 3 9 (5th Cir. 1 975).
85. Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d at 256 (footnote omitted). The remedy
for a depriva tion of liberty, it should be noted, is a name-clearing hearing before the gov
erning body. White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 685 {5th Cir. 1981), cer t. denied, 455 U.S. 1027
(1982). It is not necessary that the hearing occur prior to publication of the stigmatizing
charges. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
86. Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d at 256 (citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S.
624, 628 (1977)).
84 .

87.
88.
89.
90.

736 F.2d at 257.

Id. at 258.
Id. at 260 {Jolly, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 261.
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much sense in Judge Jolly's thinking, but procedure is procedure.
As seen in the majority's opinion, the defendants' failure to ques
tion the sufficiency of the evidence at trial by a motion for directed
verdict or motion for new trial foreclosed the point on appeal. 91
In the words of Judge G e e 's reversing opinion, Campos

v.

Guillot92 also involved a trial c o nducted under a " serious misap
prehension of the law" as it relates to the liberty interest.93 After
an investigation of alleged improper police surveillan c e by Chief of
Police Campos for his own private purposes, the city council of
Missouri City, Texas, asked for Campos' resignation. The city
manager and council wanted to keep the matter private and did
nothing to publicize their confidential findings. However, Chief
Campos insisted on and was granted a public hearing. In due
course, the Chiefs handling of his d epartment was thrown open to
public scrutiny. As a result, the council voted to fire him.
Suit followed and the jury r e turned a verdict for the Chief,

a

verdict the appellate court swiftly set aside: " [n]owhere in the
court's instructions to the jury is i t advised that unless the stigma
tizing matter i s made public by the e mployer in connection with
the discharge n o 'name-clearing' proceeding is required. "9" There
fore, the jury was left to believe that even unpublicized charges
could give rise to a right to a name-clearing hearing. As Judge Gee
concluded, " [t] hat is not the law."9� Without publication of the
charges, Campos "accrued no right to a name-clearing proceed
ing."96 Moreover, Campos' insistence to publicize the charges
against him r emoved the activity from a protected procedural
process.

Only where the public employee is publicly defamed in con
nection with his discharge is he e ntitled to an opportunity to re
spond to the charges in public. Nothing of that sort occurred here,
since Campos's employer strenuously· sought to prevent the
charges against him from becoming public. "It thus appears that
Mr. Campos himself, rather than the city, was the cause of
whatever public airing the charge s against him and his discharge
91.

Id. at 259 n.24 (majority opinion).

92. 743 F.2d 1 12 3 (5th Cir. 1984).
93. Id. at 1 1 26.
94. Id.
95.

Id.

96.

Id.
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received. "97 Because the trial court failed to charge the jury re
garding the necessary " publication" element of a liberty abridg
ment, the jury may well have returned a verdict against the de
fendants "based on charges that they had sought to keep
confidential and never published-until the plaintiff demanded it.
This was reversible error. "98
The reader may wonder what an employee is supposed to do
to save his job in the face of false accusations strenuously kept
secret by his governmental employer. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's decision in Bishop

v.

Wood99 holds, perhaps wrongly, that

"[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a
guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions . "100
Such an employee is entitled to no name-clearing hearing, al
though he "remains as free as before to seek another [job] . "1ol This
may well strike an ordinary man as unfair, especially one who owes
his daily bread to governmental employment.
Three other cases involving public employees' substantive due
process claims merit brief mention. Russell v. Harrison102 affirms a
summary judgment against former university professors who sued
when their contracts of employment were cancelled in mid-year for
fiscal reasons. Although the professors' complaint was sufficient to
state a constitutional claim, the defendant Board of Trustees' evi
dence revealed a genuine financial emergency necessitating termi
nation of the plaintiffs' contracts. The evidence showed that the
dismissals were based " on

an

analysis of the most efficient staffing

per full-time student" and "uniform criteria bearing a reasonable
relationship to the universities' financial problem."103 These find
ings satisfied the due process requirement. The court focused on
the defendant Board's actions and determined that "at the least
the actions were not arbitrary and capricious, or racially moti-

97 .

Id.

98.

Id.

99.
100.

426 U.S. 341 (1976).

v. Wood has been applied in
the Fifth Circuit, see Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965
(1 983) (Bre nnan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert.). For the au
thor's reaction to Shawgo v. Spradlin, see Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional
Law , 29 Lov. L. REV. 647, 66 (1983) ("But the net result in this case strikes me as perilously
9
wrong. ").

101.
102 .
103.

Id. at 350. For an egregious example of how Bishop

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U .S. 564, 575 (1972).
736 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 288.
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vate d." 1 0• Since the professors faile d to a d d uce evidence showing
the existence of a genuine issue o f material fact regarding the con
stitutionality of their dismissal, summary judgment against them
was proper.
Everhart v. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 21 011 reaf
firms the Fifth Circuit's general unwillingness to involve itself in
the internal affairs of public hospitals in the name o f due process.
The court uphe l d a requirement that an applicant for admission to
the med icat s taff of a public hospital must establish his "ability to
work with others" 1 06 to the satisfaction of the hospital's governing
body. Accord ing to Judge H ill's opinion, the boar d 's cons i deration
of Everhart's interpersonal relationships at the hospital was "rea
sonably relate d to the provision o f a dequate me d ical care . " 1 07 As a
result, the b o ar d's denial of s t aff membership to Everhart was
"neither arbitrary nor capricious an d d i d not d eprive him of sub
stantive d ue process . " 1 08 The Fifth Circuit requires only that "the
proce dures employe d by the hospital are fair, that the stan dards
set by the hospital are reasonable, an d that they have been applied
without arbitrariness an d capriciousness."1 09 The court also re
jected Everhart's claim that the potential effects of poor interper
sonal relationships are not a matter of me d ical expertise. While the
character of a man is, in essence, a question of human nature,
"when that character becomes embroile d in the confines of a hospi. tal environment, his character an d his ability to work effectively in
such an environment is a question uniquely suited to the hospital
board." 11 0 Lastly, given the court's " obvious lack of medical exper
tise,"m the majority opinion d emonstrated great deference to the
governing boar d 's d ecision in the grant or denial of staff privileges.
Finally, Hatton v. Wicks112 i s a hard case on its facts. How
ever, the reviewing court was quite unwilling to rescue Ethel Hat
ton from a firing for insubord ination, although she had taught the
sixth grade at the same school for ten years. In this case, the court
104.

Id.

105. 757 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 1572.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1573 (citing Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1 159,
1 162 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978)).
110. 757 F.2d at 1573.

Laje, 564 F.2d at 1 1 62).

111.

Id. at 1572 (citing

112.

744 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1984) (summary calendar).
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found that Mississippi law was not controlling: "Mississippi cannot
by defining 'insubordination' or other grounds for discharge of
teachers create or eliminate federal constitutional rights. The fed
eral rights are independent of the state law. "113
No question was raised concerning the motive for Hatton's
discharge. She was fired for twice failing to accept a "disciplinary
problem" into her class when ordered to do so by the principal.
Although the particular pupil was unruly, "he did not constitute
such a serious problem that he could not attend regular school
classes with other students."11" O n these facts there was no viola
tion of substan tive due process. The principal had the right to
make the challenged assignment; the teacher had no right to
refuse.
Judge Williams bends over backwards to explain that "a
teacher who refuses to carry out her or his obligations in this man
ner is 'interfering with the regular operation of the schools,' and is
engaged in conduct which 'materially and substantially impedes
the operation or effectiveness of the educational program.' "11 5
Under these circumstances, Judge Williams concluded that the
court would not interf ere in the details of the school's administra
tion; the majority found no constitutional violation in this case.116
Moreover, there was neither "the slightest hint of racial, religious,
or gender discrimination, [n]or interference with her free speech or
other personal rights."117 One senses that Judge Williams' opinion
is aimed directly at appellant; he seeks to explain the law to a
sixth-grade teacher, not to a lawyer versed in substantive due pro
cess, and to affirm only after a thorough public airing of the facts
and the law.
On the other hand, Judge Jolly would have affirmed Ethel
Hatton's firing without troubling over an appellate opinion. In his
special concurrence, he quipped that "to dwell on cases like this
trivializes the truly important values and rights protected by the
Constitution of the United States of America."118 "That federal
courts should be made to second-guess everyday , mundane, ordi113. Id. at 503.
114. Id. at 504.
115. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) and Bran tley v.
Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983)).
116.

744 F.2d at 504.

117. Id.
118. Id. (Jolly, J., specially concurring).
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nary, nonracial administrative decisions of the st� t e school �ystem
demonstrates how pandering to the common cavils o f pubhc em
ployees leads to the wasted time , expense, and inconvenience of all
parties."119 These are harsh words, bluntly ex pressed and sincer�ly
believed. However, Judge Williams ' opinion, joined by Judge Hill,

� u.n

probably was aimed more at dispelling any lingering sense o

fairness among the public school teachers of C olumbus, Missis
sippi, than at pandering to the cavils of one of their number.
IV.

PUBLIC EMPLOYM ENT AND PROC ED URAL DUE
PROCE S S

Judge Politz's prescient opi nion i n Findeisen

v.

North East

Independent School District120 protects all tenured public school
teachers in the Fifth Circuit from discharge without n otice of the
reasons for the discharge and pre-termination opportunity to re
spond. The opinion lays down important blac k letter law: "Where
the property interest is the employment of a tenured public school
teacher the teacher must be provided timely notice an d an oppor
tunity to answer charges so as to minimize the likelihood of an er
roneous discharge. "12l The court carefully distinguishes Parratt v.
Taylor122 which holds that post-deprivation state tort r emedies are
sufficient to generate "either the n e cessity of quick action by the
State or the impracticability of providing any meaningful
predeprivation process can . . . satisfy the requiremen ts of proce
dural due process."123 Unlike Parra tt, the present action
affects Findeisen's professional standing and livelihood. The termi
nation of a tenured public school teacher adversely impacts on the
teacher's personal and professional standing in both the educational
community and the greater societal community. Findeisen's claim is
not for a few dollars worth of hobby goods which were negligently

�

los ; it involves his career . . . . [T]here was no necessity for hasty
action; no emergency existed . . . . [A]bsent the occasional emergency, a school board can easily hold a meaningful predeprivation
hearing to
teacher.124

119.
120.
121.
122.
i23.
124.

properly consider

whether

to

discharge

a

tenured

Id.

749
749
451
749
749

F.2d
F.2d
U.S.
F.2d
F.2d

234 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2657 ( 1 985).
at 239.
527 (1981).
at 238 (footnote omitted) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539).
at 239.
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In the context of discharge of a tenured public school teacher, the
court perceived "no Parratt-directed change in the essential teach
&
ings of Roth, Sind e rmann and their progeny . " 1 2 Now here, cer
tainly, is straight talk from the federal bench. 1 28 It is always grati
fying to read law that fits reality.
On the other hand, Judge Garwood's concurring opin i o n in
Findeisen questions why pre-termination process is constit ution
ally due when "wholly adequate and previously well established
state procedures exist under which the School District's actions
may be subsequently challenged ' de novo' and full recovery had for
any economic loss. " 1 2 7 As Judge Garwood sees it, "[t]hat protection
of this special, pre d eprivation kind is constitutionally required
across the board for all state employees with any type of tenure or
employment contract seems unrealistic and not in keeping with
our traditional expectations and understandings. " 1 28 Nevertheless,
Judge Garwood agr e e s with the majorit y , noting that "[t]hese
anomalies, however, a p p ear sufficiently enmeshed in the current
tangled web of the jurisprudence on this s ubject as to be b eyond
attempted amelioration by a panel of this Court. "1 29
It is to Judge Politz's credit that the t angle d web is n o m ore.
Less than two months after Findeisen w a s handed down, the Su
preme Court, in Cle veland Boar d of Education v. Lou dermill, iso
reached the same result and used the same reasoning found in the
carefully drafted opinion by Judge Politz. The parallels in thinking
are striking. According to Justice White, "[t]he need for some form
of pretermination hearing . . . is evident from a balancing of the
competing interests at stake. " 131 Reflecting the thinking of our Cir125. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and
Perry v. Sincermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
126. Judge Wisdom's companion opinions in Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1984) and Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984) are also perceptive judicial
canvasses that distinguish Parratt v. Taylor and hold it inapplicable "if the plaintiff alleges
a violation of a substantive right protected by the Constitution against infringement by
state governments." Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d at 327. And in the context of procedural due
process, "Parratt applies only when the nature of the challenged conduct is such that the
provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards is impracticable or infeasible." Id. at 329.
In other words, "Parratt

v.

Taylor is not a magic wand that can make any section 1983

action resembling a tort suit disappear into thin air," said Judge Wisdom, another straight
shooter from the bench. Id.
127.

749 F.2d at 240 (Garwood, J., concurring).

128.

Id. at 240-41 (footnote omitted).

129.

Id. at 241.

130.
131.

105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
Id. at 1494.
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cuit Justice and Judge Politz, the C ourt held that " the significance
of the private interest in retain ing employment cannot be gain
said."132 Furthermore, the Court found that an opportunity for the
employee to respond to an imminent discharge is essential to an
accurate court decision. 133 B oth Justice White and Judge Politz
agreed that neither a governmental interest in immediate termina
tion nor an administrative burden or delay would outweigh the in
terest in affording an employee a predetermination hearing. 134
Thus, it is now the sensible law of the Constitution that all
tenured public employees are vested with a property right in con
tinued employment. According t o Loudermill,
[t]he opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing,
why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due pro
cess requirement. The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the em
ployer's evidence, and

an

opportunity to present his side of the

story.135

Notice that this gives a public employee a chance to save his job
before he is let go; he is entitled t o present his side of the story
before the axe falls. The rationale behind this protecti on is the be
lief that talk between an employee and his public employer may
dispel differences between them, saving a job now and then.
Before noting a few technical pointers touching procedural
due process and public empl oyment, it is worth observing that the
same Dr. Davis who lost his free speech verdict to Judges Hill,
Rubin, and Tate in Davis v. West Community Hospita/136 suc
ceeded in convincing the panel t o affirm on due process grounds.
As a result, the decision reinstated Dr. Davis to the medical staff
and upheld a $10,000 jury verdict for due process damages.
Turning to the technical points of the case, first, because there
existed a factual dispute as to the sufficiency of the hearing proce
dures resulting in Davis's suspension, "the due process issue was
properly presented to the jury."137 In other words, lawyers who try
these due process cases for plaintiffs would do well t o probe the
132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134.

Id. at 1495.

135.

Id. at 1495 (citation omitted).

136.

755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra note 6 3 and accompanyin g text.

137.

755 F.2d at 464.
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decision making of their opponent. For example, in this case, the
hospital board allowed Dr. Davis to present evidence during the
suspension hearings. However, it appears that the actual decision
making body did not consider such evidence in its final determina
tion. Thus, it is to counsel's credit that he unearthed such damning
data during the discovery phase. One never knows what one will
find by deep digging into the enemy's files.
Second, even though Dr. Davis suffered .no resulting loss of in
come-indeed he earned more money at other hospitals-he still
took $10,000 in due process "actual damages."138 Just what these
actual damages are is not self-evident, although there is talk in an
other case of "damages for mental or emotional distress fiowing
from the loss of [plaintiff's] procedural right s "1 39 Denial of due
process, it seems, can be a c ostly thing.
.

Ad Damnum

Related to the issue o f damages is the back pay principle of
Wheeler

v.

Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority . 140

Ms. Wheeler was lawfully terminated on September 27 for stealing
Tranxene, a drug, from her workplace. Judge Jolly quite properly
held Wheeler was unconstitutionally fired on August 4 because her
initial discharge did not meet the stringent demands of due pro
cess. Interestingly enough, all this procedural deficiency was later
cured by a procedurally flawless hearing on September 27. The
question then became whether Ms. Wheeler should take back pay
from August 4 to September 27. The court held on this issue as
follows:
If, however, the defendants fail to prove that Wheeler would have
been dismissed on August 4 absent procedural defects, Wheeler will
be entitled to back pay from August 4 until S eptember 27. In that
case, the procedural due process violation could properly be viewed
as the cause of the initial discharge and the award of back pay
ui
would constitute compensation to Wheeler rather than a windfall.

The justice of the Wheeler rule is likely to escape lay perception ,
138. Id. at 468.
139. Wheeler v. Mental Health & Mental Retardation Auth., 752 F.2d 1063, 1072 (5th
Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). "Those damages, however, must be proved; they will not
be presume d." Id. (citing
Russell v. Harrison, 736 F.2d 283, 291 n.17 (5th Cir. 1984); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978)
).
140. Wheeler, 752 F.2d 1063.
141. Id. at 1071-72.
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although most assuredly it is a sound prophylactic against sloppy
discharges. The court emphasizes that even absent a denial of lib
erty or of p roperty, "the right to procedural due process is 'abso
lute' in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a
claimant's s ubstantive assertions, and because of the importance to
organized society that procedural due process be observed. "142
As

mentioned earlier,

Wheeler may recover

damages for

"mental or emotional distress flowing from the loss of her proce
dural rights,"143 regardless of defendants' success in proving an
H o wever, these
damages must be proved; they w ill not be presumed. 1 44 An other

August 4 discharge absent procedural defects.

panel of Fifth Circuit judges confronting the same kind of problem
opined that " [ w] here no substantive violation of rights can be
shown, it is difficult to envision what actual damages plaintiff
might prove. "1.a The Fifth Circuit has expressed skepticism as to
whether actual damages resulting solely from denial of due process
ever can be proven, although our circuit has afforded plaintiffs an
opportunity to prove such damages. 146
V.

HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE SCHOOLS

The ruling of the Fifth C ircuit in Gay Student Services

v.

Texas A & M University147 requires Texas A & M to recognize a
gay student group notwithstanding the Board of Regents' solemn
declaration that
[s]o-called "gay" activities run diabolically [sic-diametrically?]
counter to the traditions and standards of Texas A & M University,
and the Board of Regents is determined to defend the suit filed
against it by three students seeking "gay" recognition and, if neces
sary, to proceed in every legal way to prohibit any group with such
goals from organizing or operating on this or any other campus for
which this Board is responsible. 148

The Regents lost.

142.
1984).

Carey

v.

Piphus, 435

U.S.

at 266, quoted in Russell, 736 F.2d at 291

143.
144.

752 F . 2 d at 1072 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Id.

145.

Russell, 736 F.2d at 291 n.17.

146.

See Wilson

147.

737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105

148.

737 F.2d at 1322 (correction suggested by the Fifth Circuit).

v.

Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Cir. 1981).

S.

Ct. 1860 (1985).

(5th

Cir.
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Within three days of this decision, in Naragon v. �Vharton,149
the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana State University could legally
remove Kristine Naragon, an avowed lesbian, from her classroom
in Baton Rouge.
What follow are a few comments that seek to expose inconsis
tencies in the law of colleges and courts as it has evolved over the
past seventy years. Consi deration of these two cases in tandem
sharpens the legal mind a n d uncovers troublesome issues of law
and fact lurking beneath the surface of what the judges tell us i n
their opinions.
A.

Background

First we must go back i n time some �eventy years to Oxford,
Mississippi, to the days of Chancellor Kincannon's administration
at the University of Mississippi. According t o local history, "the

troublesome issue of the anti-fraternity agitation"160 occupied ev

eryone's mind in those early days. It seems a fellow named Lee
Russell was snubbed by one of the Greek fraternities on campus;
he never forgot nor forgave the snubbing. Later, Lee became Gov

ernor Russell, a keen supporter of a bill in the Mississippi Legisla
ture outlawing Greek-letter fraternities on the campus of Ole Miss.
The following account of the struggle suggests the flavor of the
fight:
Lee M. Russell, who as a student led the fight against the fraterni
ties, was now active in state politics and once more led the fight.
The matter was discussed favorably and unfavorably in the public
press and ultimately reached the floor of the state legislature . Some
of the arguments used to discredit the Greek-letter societies were
that they encouraged dissipation, they led to waste of money, that
they discouraged study and scholarship, that they interfered with
the work of the literary societies, that they destroyed "college spirit"
by fostering cliques. But the crowning criticism was that they had

been the cause of social ostracism of the non-fraternity students by

the people of Oxford. Whether these charges were true or not, the
legislatu re saw fit in 1 9 12 to prohibit secret societies in the state's
schools by passing a law which remained on the statute books for
fourteen years. m
149.

737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984) .
.
150. A CABANISS, THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI: ITS FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 126 (2d
ed. 197 1) .
151 .

Id. at 127. Today, of course, the campus at Ole Miss is full of fraternities: "Be-
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Now, as far as lawyers are c oncerned, the next stop is to as
whether such a college regulation would hold up in court. Ind� ed it
did, despite a Kappa Sigma's argument that the statute abridged
.
the fourteenth amendment because it " 'without r eason deprives
the complainant of his property and property right, libert� and his
harmless pursuit of happiness, and denies to the c o mplainant the
equal protection of the law of the state of Mississip p i . ' "1 62
Notice this says nothing about freedom to asso c iate, and yet
the allegatio ns come close to those in the Gay Studen t Services
case, as we shall see in a moment . Further, note that the Oxford,
Mississippi, fraternity boys of 1 9 1 2 claimed only the "harmless
pursuit of happiness." Whether an association of homosexual stu
dents at C ollege Station, Texas, is similarly harmless today is a
point over which colleges and courts have sharply d ivided. Cer
tainly these cases of "Greeks" and "Gays "1 63 offer an intriguing
comparison.

The Oxford charge was accentuated "by the allegation that
the society of which the complainant [was] a member ' has for its
paramount purpose the promotion and enforcement of good
morals, the highest possible attainment and standing in the clas
ses, and good order and discipline in the student bodies of the dif
ferent colleges with which it is c onnected.' " 1 11 4 Here is how Justice
Joseph McKenna, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court in
cluding such minds as Oliver Wendell Holmes and Charles Evans
Hughes, responded in Waugh v. Board of Trustees. 166 Although
well-nigh forgotten, this case still remains controlling authority:
It is said that the fraternity to which complainant belongs is a
moral and of itself a disciplinary force. This need not be denied. But
whether such membership makes against discipline was for the state
of Mississippi to determine. It is to be remembered that the Univer
sity was established by the state, and is under the control of the

cause University of Mississippi students have had to fight for their fraternities, they idealize
them." Id. at 188 n.49. Upon inquiry, ex rel. Morris Marx, Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, the University of Mississippi, Jan. 2 2 , 1986, the writer learned that no gay students
group has demanded recognition from the authorities at Ole Miss, not to date at least, al
though the law of the Fifth Circuit binds Mississippi as well as Texas.
152. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589, 593 (1915).
153. "I shall, in most cases, use the term 'gay' to describe both men and women whose
sexual orientation is toward persons of the same sex. Gay is the preferred word." Rivera.
Queer • Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv.
459, 463 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Rivera].
154. Waugh , 237 U.S. at 593.
155. 237 U.S. 589.
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state, and the enactment of the statute may have been induced by
the opinion that membership in the prohibited societies divided the
attention of the students, and distracted from that singleness of
purpose which the state desired to exist in its public educational
institutions. It is not for us to entertain conjectures in opposition to
the views of the state, and annul its regulations upon disputable
considerations of their wisdom or necessity.166

So far as I can tell, the Fifth Circuit has followed Waugh only
once, citing it in support of a rule requiring haircuts in the public
schools 1117
.

B.

Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University

Judges Brown, Reavley, and Williams quite boldly held clearly
erroneous the district court's finding of fact that Gay Student Ser
vices is just like a Greek fraternity subject to Texas A & M's tradi
tional ban on fraternal organizations on campus.1118 For over 100
years, Texas A & M has chosen not to include Greek fraternities
and sororities as an official part of its educational program. As the
administration explained, " [t]he University has supported the pre
mise that its social character was developed in the concept of to
getherness in that all students were Aggies and that a social caste
system would detract from this most important concept which
welded together the students that attended Texas A & M."H9
Without questioning Texas A & M's exclusion of Greeks from
its educational
program-an exclusion
legally linked
to
Waugh-the appellate court did state that the district· court's
156.

Id. at 596-97.

Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 393
856 (1968). For the end of the hair story in the Fifth Circuit, see the 8 to 7 en bane
split in Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) (likewise
157.

U.S.

upholding hair cuts in the public schools). In his dissent, Judge Wisdom pointed his finger
at Justice Black, whose views carried majority weight in the Fifth Circuit:
The Court apparently takes its cue from the late Mr. Justice Black's suggestion that
the only "serious" aspect of a "long hair case" is "the idea that anyone should think
the Federal Constitution imposes on the United States courts the burden of supervis
ing the length of hair that public school students should wear."
460 F.2d at 619 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Certiorari was denied by the Supreme court.
158.

"[W]e conclude that the District Court's factual findings with regard to the

nature of GSS were clearly erroneous. We think it clear from the facts that TAMU
refused officially to recognize GSS based upon the homosexual content of the group's
ideas-which it sought to convey through implementing its stated goals
purposes."

Gay Student Servs., 737 F.2d at 1324.
159. Id. at 1321-22.

and
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analogizing G ay Student Services (GSS) to Greek fraternities is
_
"utterly at o dds with the asserted purposes of GSS , which soug ht
.
recognition to provide services and information regarding gay is
sues to gay persons and to the general public. " 1 60 What GSS
wB.nted to d o was to pro vide the Texas A & M community with
"information concerning the structures and realitie s of gay life"
and to "provide a forum for the interchange of ideas and construc
tive solutions to gay people's problems. " 1 8 1 Surely these goals sur
pass mere socializing. Furthermore, the University's asserted rea
sons for denying recognition were based on the belief "that the
organization would attempt to convey ideas about homosexual
ity. " 182 In short, the refusal to recognize the group was clearly "tied
to the homosexual nature of the group. " 1 8 3 For this reason, the de
fense did not center on the frate rnal nature of the GSS. Instead, as
Judge Brown tells us in his opinion, " [t]he evidence presented at
trial consisted almost solely of medical testimony from specialists
in human sexuality regarding the effect the presence of a homosex
ual student group might have o n a university campus. " 1 64
Plainly, the panel was correct to reject the facile equation of
Gay Student Services to Sigma Phi Epsilon. As for the law, Judge
Brown explained that the Supreme Court's standards enunciated
in Healy v. James16 r. are controlling: The reader will recall that

Healy reverse d and remanded a denial of college recognition to a
local student chapter of Students for a Democratic Society. Healy
rests upon the first amendment " right of individuals to associate to
further their personal beliefs. " 1 66 The rationale of the holding is
that " [t]here can be no doubt that denial of official recognition,

without justification, to college o rganizations burdens or abridges
that associational right. "1 67
Of course, one crucial step beyond "questions of affiliation and
philosophy" 168 lie questions directed at SDS's acti v i ties not its
philosophy. In other words, advocacy of ideas is one thi g; advo-

�

Id.
Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
160.

at 1322.

161.

at 1320.
at 1322 (emphasis in original).
(footnote omitted).
at 1321.

165.
166.

408 U.S. 169 (1972).
Id. at 181.

167.
168.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 188.
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cacy of "imminent lawless action"169 is quite another. But the rec
ord in Healy as recited by the Supreme Court disclosed "no sub
stantial basis"170 for the University's fear that recognition of the
local chapter of SDS would pose a threat of imminent lawless ac
tion or of "actions which 'materially and substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school. ' " 171 Denial o f recognition on this
unsubstantiated factual basis was therefore unconstitutional. 172
By parity of reasoning, our circuit court rejects the claim that
recognition of Gay Student Services at College Station would likely
"incite, promote, and result"173 in homosexual acts. The court
added that there exists evidence neither that any illegal activity
has occurred as a result o f GSS 's existence in the past, nor that
proscribed homosexual activity will result from this organization in
the future. The court emphasized that "while Texas law may pro
hibit certain homosexual practices, no Texas law makes it a crime
to be a homosexual."17" C onsistent with Healy, our circuit judges
could not conclude that the " 'critical line . . . between advocacy
and action' has been violated in this case."176
At trial, Texas A & M also asserted that "recognition of GSS
would encourage more homosexual conduct, resulting in an in
crease in the number of persons with the psychological and physio 
logical problems TAMU's experts claimed were more prevalent
among homosexuals than among heterosexuals. "176 Moreover, the
University asserted that denial of recognition was justifiable as an
appropriate measure in protecting public health. Whether this is
true or not seems to be a medical question upon which experts
differ. However, the district court did say that " [t]he Court finds
the testimony that male homosexuals pose a significant public
169. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion).
"[T]he critical line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between advocacy, which
is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not." Healy, 408 U.S. at 192.

170. Healy, 408 U.S. at 190.
171. Id. at 189. The test of "material and substantial" disruption originated in the law
of the Fifth Circuit,
see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966), and was picked
up by the Supreme Court
in Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community School Dist. , 393 U.S.
503, 509, 513 (1969) and carried over into Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
1 72. 408 U.S. at 191. "[l] nsofar as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it consti
tuted little more
than the sort of 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
[which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' " Id. (quoting Tinke r,
393 U.S. at 508).
173.

737 F.2d at 1328.
174. Id. (emphasis in original) .
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1330.
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incid ence of venereal
health problem because they h ave greater
disease to b e credib le."177
Our appellate court was not impressed:
This asserted [health] justification must fail for the same rea
sons the others did: TAMU has simply not proven that recognition
will indeed imminently result in such dire consequences. The specu
lative evidence offered by the defendants' experts " for which no his
torical or empirical basis is disclosed," cannot justify T AMU's con
tent-based refusal to recognize GSS. 178

The reference to speculative medical testimony "for which no his
torical or empirical basis is disclosed" is a borrowed phrase from
an Eighth Circuit decision, Gay Lib v . University of Missouri.119 In
this case, a divided panel of judges held that the Unive rsity's re
fusal to recognize Gay Lib as a campus organization denied plain
tiffs their first amendment rights. The First and Fourth Circuits
have reached the same conclusion . 1 80 The Eighth Circuit's Gay Lib
opinion drops a cautionary footno te that may strike the reader as
strange: " [R]e cognition of Gay Lib i s not determinative of whether
its members will be allowed to meet or associate, but only of
whether the group may use school facilities and become eligible for
student activities funds."181 Judge Brown's opinion for our Fifth
Circuit certainly suggests that formal recognition carries with it a

177.

Id. at 1328 n.17.

178.

Id. at 1330.

179.

558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).

180. Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students
Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). In the former case, Chief
Judge Markey of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, pointed
out in his concurring opinion that these cases show "the futility of the association-register
ing process at state-supported institutions of higher education." 544 F.2d at 167 (Markey,
C.J., concurring). Judge Markey continued: "Thus, associations devoted to peaceful advo
cacy of decriminalization or social acceptance of sadism, euthanasia, masochism, murder,
genocide, segregation, master-race theories, gambling, voodoo, and the abolishment of all
higher education, to list a few, must be granted registration . . . " Id. Recognition is re
quired by the first amendment, according to Judge Markey, notwithstanding the imprima
tur effect:
That registration and recognition of an organization do not imply approval of
its aims is, in my view, a fiction. The impression that the aims of registered and
recognized associations are at least unobjectionable to university authorities is, of
course, one of the reasons plaintiff seeks registration and is the fundamental rationale
of defendants in refusing it. I think it clear that registration and recognition confer
a
status not enjoyed by unregistered and unrecognized associations.
Id. at 168.
.

181.

558 F.2d at 854 n. 1 1 .

1985]

Constitutional Law

669

right to meet on campus. 182
It is worth noting that Justice Holmes would not have ap
proved our circuit's applying the law of "clear and present danger"
to the situation of Gay Student Services at College Station.183 And
most assuredly, Holmes as a judge would not so freely discount the
competing views of medical experts on the homosexual question.
Based on Judge Brown's own recitation of the expert medical testi
mony in the Gay Student Services case-testimony which the dis
trict court found "credible"-one might conclude that the Regents'
argument was not without substance. A close reading of the opin
ion yields the acknowledgment that " [t]he d efense in particular
centered on statistics and opinions documenting increased crime
rates and severe emotional problems found within the homosexual
community."184 This evidence is arguably more than mere specula
tion " 'for which no historical or empirical basis is disclosed. ' " 1 85
With all due respect, it is unlikely that the record is as naked as
the panel describes it to be. Such is the danger of borrowing a neat
phrase from the law of the Eighth Circuit and applying it to a
Fifth Circuit record.
The dissenting judge along with an evenly d ivided court in the
Missouri Gay Lib case also thought that the University's expert
medical testimony was neither "skimpy [nor] speculative."188 Here
182. One of the advantages of official recognition, as pointed out by Judge Brown, is
"[a]uthorization to hold meetings and functions on campus," together with "free use of uni
versity meeting rooms and facilities." 737 F.2d at 1319 n.3.
183. "It does an ill-service to the author of the most quoted judicial phrases regarding
freedom of speech, to make him the victim of a tendency which he fought all his life,
whereby phrases are made to do service for critical analysis by being turned into dogma."
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 352 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "It is one o f
t�e misfortun es of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long
tune cease to provoke f rther analysis." Holmes, J., dissenting, in Hyde v. United States,
u
225 U.S. 347, 391
(1912). " 'Clear and present danger' was never used by Mr. Justice Holmes
� express a technic
al legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases. It was a
literary phrase not to be
distorted by being taken from its context." Pennek amp , 328 U.S.
at 352- 53 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
A little later, the Supreme Court repeated the point that "neither Justice Holmes nor
Justice Brandeis ever envisioned that a shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a rigid
rut� to be applied inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of each case." Dennis v .
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). There are plenty of cases in the Fifth Circuit that
recognize the suprem
acy of context over catch phrase. See, e.g. , Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
184.

737 F.2d at 1321.
Id. at 1330 (quoting Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1080 ( 1978) ).
186. Gay Lib, 558 F.2d at 858 (Regan, J., dissenting) (brackets in the original).

185.
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is what Chief Judge Gibson had to say: "Lacking training in the
psychiatric discipline, appellate j udges are ill-pr� par� d to concl�de
.
that these expert psychiatric opinions lack an h1sto� 1cal or e�pm
�
cal basis."187 Justice Rehnquist's d issent from a denial of cert10rari
in the Gay

Lib

case also demonstrates a sharp split

among judges

addressing the issues central to this dispute.
Expert psychological testimony below established the fact that the
meeting together of individuals who consider themselves homosex
ual in an officially recognized university organization can have a dis
tinctly different effect from the mere advocacy of repeal of the
State's sodomy statute. As the University has recognized, this dan
ger may be particularly acute in the university setting where many
students are still coping with the sexual problems which accompany
late adolescence and early adulthood.188

Whether the reader agrees with Justice Rehnquist, or with
Judge Brown for that matter, is not my concern here. I

focus only
although I will venture to say
that whatever else one thinks o f the jurisprudence of William
Rehnquist, there can be no doubt that he has a stinging legal
on the exposure of competing views,

mind. Here is how Rehnquist the lawyer analyzes the Gay Lib's
demand for campus recognition:
From the point of view of the [Gay Lib ] , the question is little differ
ent from whether university recognition of a college Democratic club
in fairness also requires recognition of a college Republican club.
From the point of view of the University, however, the question is
more akin to whether those suffering from measles have a constitu
tional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate to
gether and with others who do not presently have measles, in order
to urge repeal of a state law providing that measle sufferers be quar
antined. The very act of assemblage under these circumstances un
dercuts a significant interest of the State which a plea for the repeal
of the law would in no wise do. Where between these two polar char
acterizations of the issue the truth lies is not as important as
whether a federal appellate court i s free to reject the University's
characterization, particularly when i t is supported by the findings of
the District Court. 189

187. 558 F.2d at 860 (Gibson, C.J., joined by Henley, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane).
188. 434 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
dissenting
from denial of certiorari) .
189.

Id. a t 1084.
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As I have said, the district court in the Gay Student Services
case found Texas A & M's expert medical testimony "credible."
Yet on appeal, the panel rushes to its own independent judgment
on the facts and the law, quite contrary to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) and to the confining strictures of Pullman-Stan
dard u. Swint.190 Again the Supreme Court has recently reminded
us that "[t]his standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court
to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is con
vinced that it would have decided the case differently."191 Justice
White writing for the majority further added that " [t]he reviewing
court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52 if it under
takes to duplicate the role of the lower court." 192
But quite apart from this procedural nicety, the latest devel
opments of substance suggest that we have not heard the last word
on the homosexual question, including the first amendment claim
of gay students and teachers who want to assemble and talk in the
public schools. The Supreme Court has called upward the Elev
enth Circuit's ruling in Hardwick v. Bowers193 to determine
whether Georgia's sodomy statute is unconstitutional. Judge
Reavley's en bane opinion in Baker v. Wade194 holds quite the con
trary in the Fifth Circuit where sodomy remains a crime in Dallas.
Doubtless, Judge Reavley knows that Baker v. Wade is no immi
nent threat to the Gay Student Services opinion which he joined.
Sodomy is one thing, talk is another. Yet as last Term's four-to
four split in the National Gay Task Force196 case shows, the dis
tinction between advocacy and action in the context of homosexu
ality in the public schools is not as clear a guide to judicial judg
ment as might first appear on the surface of legal analysis.
There is afoot among judges the rival view that, although the
first amendment protects political expression and association,
[t]he advocacy of a practice as universally condemned as the crime
of sodomy hardly qualifies as such. There is no need to establish
that such advocacy will interfere, substantially or otherwise, in nor
mal school activities. It is sufficient that such advocacy is advanced
190. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
191. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 105 S . Ct. 1 504, 1511 (1985).
192. Id.
193. 760 F.2d 1202 ( 1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S. Ct. 342 (1985) .
194. 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
195. Board of Educ., Okla. v. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985), aff'g

per c uria m by an equally divided court, 729 F.2d 1270 ( 1 0th Cir. 1984).

[Vol. 3 1:639

Loyola Law Review

672

in a manner that creates a su bstan tial risk that such c onduct will
encourage sch o o l children to commit the a bominable crime against
_
nature. This finds solid support in Tinker [v. Des Moines Indepen
dent Community School District ] , where the Cour t said "First
Amendment rights must always be a p p lied 'in light of the special
character istics of the . . . environment' in the particular case. " 196

Four current Supreme Court justices apparently agree with this
view.197
Incidentally, the judge who first brought the

Waugh fraternity

boys case to my attention was Mr. Justice Black, a fi erce defender
of first amendment freedoms. For Justice Black,
amen dment case, just as

Waugh was a first

Gay Student Services is a first amen d

ment case. In his dissent in Tinker, Justice Black recalled that
" [t]he State had [in

Waugh] pas s e d a law barring students from

peaceably assembling in Greek letter fraternities and providing
that students who joined them could be expelled from school. This
law would appear on the surface t o run afoul of the First Amend
ment's freedom of assembly clause. "198 Yet as those familiar with
Justice Black's opinions know, the Judge sided with the school offi
cials, not the students, in the Tinker black armband school case.199
Here is how Elizabeth Black, who was sitting in the wives' section
at Court, describes the moment in her diary:
Monday, February 24,

1969

Abe Fortas delivered the

opinion in the Tinker Mourning Band School case and Hug o, as the
television said, delivered a blistering dissent. His dissent, so said the
paper , was twenty-five minutes long. I was on the edge of my chair ,
hands and fee t like ice, and the
shock.200

brethren in var ious stages of

196. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1277 ( 1 0th Cir. 1984)
(Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting in part Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 ( 1969).
197. 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985), where the Court's enigmatic silence on this issue is pre
served in its per curiam decision. An affirmance by an equally divided Court without an
opinion, of course, leaves the reader guessing as to the competing judicial views. "Legal
scuttlebutt has Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan affirming the decision and Bur
ger, O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist dissenting . . . . Both gay advocates and the
?�Iahoma City Board of Education publically claimed victory. However, most
gay rights
litigators breathed a sigh of relief that another decision survived the Supreme Court."
Ri
vera, supra note 153, at 533 (footnote omitted) .
198. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522·23 (Black, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 526.
200. H.L. BLACK & E. BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS BLACK:
The Memoirs of Hugo L .
Black and Elizabeth Black 217 (P.R. Baier ed. 1986).
.
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In no uncertain terms, Justice Black reminded his Tinker listeners
of the "complete relevan [ce of Waugh's reasoning] for us today":20 1
[T]he enactment of the statute may have been induced by the
opinion that membership i n the prohibited societies divided the at
tention of the students a n d distracted from that singleness of pur
pose which the State desired to exist in its public educational in
stitutions. It is not for us to entertain conjectures in opposition to
the views of the State and annul its regulations upon disputable
considerations of their wisdom or necessity. 202

Based upon this argument, Justice Black relates that the Waugh
Court upheld "the power of Mississippi to curtail the First Amend
ment's right of peaceable assembly."203
A little later a schoolboy sued in federal court challenging a
rule requiring schoolboys' hair not to hang over their ears. Again
Justice Black sided with the school principal, not the sixteen-year
old.204 And when the Supreme Court was urged to recognize the
disease of chronic alcoholism as a defense to drunkenness in the
street (or on campus), Justice Black refused "to plunge . . . into
the murky problems raised by the insistence that chronic al
coholics cannot be punished for public drunkenness, problems that
no person, whether layman or expert, can claim to understand, and
with consequences that no one can safely predict. "205
C.

Naragon

v.

Wharton

The question of homosexual teachers i n the classroom, espe201.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 523 (Black, J., dissenting).

202.
203.

Id. (quoting Waugh, 237 U.S. at 596-97) (emphasis added by Black).
393 U.S. at 523 (Black, J., dissenting).

204. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1202-03 (1971) (Chambers Opinion, Black, J.)
(denial of a motion to vacate a stay of injunction pending appeal):
The motion in this case is presented to me in a record of more than 50 pages,
not counting a number of exhibits. The words used throughout the record such as
"Emergency Motion" and "harassment" and "irreparable damages" are calculated to
leave the impression that this case over the length of hair has created or is about to
create a great national "crisis." I confess my inability to understand how anyone
would thus classify this hair length case. The only thing about it that borders on the
serious to me is the idea that anyone should think the Federal Constitution imposes
on the United States courts the burden of supervising the length of hair that public
school students should wear.
A majo rity of the Fifth Circuit agreed with Justice Black. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609
(5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), discussed in note 157 supra.
205. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (Black, J., joined by Harlan, J.,
con curring).
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cially in the primary and secondary grades, has "swirled nation
wide for many years. "206 Whether teachers-male or female-may
lawfully be expelled from the classroom merely because they are
gay depends on the educational level in question and o n the law of
the forum state. In one high school case an English teacher named
Gish was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination after he
assumed the presidency of the New Jersey Gay Activists Alli
ance.207 School officials claimed Gish's actions displayed "deviation
from normal mental health which may affect his ability to teach,
discipline and associate with the students. "208
The appellate court affirmed: "A teacher works i n a sensitive
area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds
toward the society in which they live,"209 said the New Jersey
judges, borrowing from Mr. Justice Minton 's opinion i n Adler v.
Board of Education.210 Moreover , " [t] hat the school authorities
have the right and duty to screen the officials, teachers, and em
ployees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity o f the schools
as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. " 2 1 1 Off to the psy
chiatrist went Mr. Gish. Candor compels me to say that this was
1976, before the "celebration"212 of gay rights in this country, and

of course, was a case involving the purge of Communists,
not homosexuals, from the classroom. 21 3

Adler,

In the

Morrison214

case, the California Supreme Court rejected

the view, found in some decisions, that homosexuality equals unfit
ness to teach:

"The private conduct of a man, who is also a

206. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 105 S. Ct.
1373, 1375 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(quoting Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 730 F.2d
444, 453 (6th Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., dissenting)) .
207. Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (App. Div. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
208. 366 A.2d at 1341-42.
209. Id. at 1342 (quoting Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 ( 1 951)).
210. 342. U.S. 485 (1952).
211.

366 A.2d at 1342 (quoting Adler, 342 U.S. at 493).

212. "Though homosexuals are not 'celebrating' in the United States it remains the
case that, in the judgment of many, homosexuality is the worst fate tha could befall a
person." Slovenko, Foreword: The Homosexual and Society: A Hist orical Perspective, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 445, 456-57 (1985).

;

213. This is not to say, however, that the hysteria of the '50's did not touch homosexu
als: "In 1950 the senate produced a report on the Employment of Homosexuals and Other
Sex Perverts in G ove rn ment." Slovenko, supra note 212, at 448.
4. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3 d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(l96
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teacher, is a proper concern to those who employ him only to the
extent it mars him as a teacher,"2 u said Justice Tobriner in an
opinion heralded as a landmark by gay rights enthusiasts. " 'Where
[a teacher's] professional achievement is unaffected, where the
school community is placed in n o jeopardy, his private acts are his
own business and may not be the basis of discipline. ' "216 By way of
contrast, the law in Washington State is less liberal. There, a ho
mosexual high school teacher named Gaylord was held lawfully
fired upon findings that

[a]fter Gaylord's homosexual status became publicly known, it
would and did impair his teaching efficiency. A teacher's efficiency is
determined by his relationship with his students, their parents, the
school administration and fellow teachers. If Gaylord had not been
discharged after he became known as a homosexual, the result
would be fear, confusion, suspicion, parental concern and pressure
on the administration by students, parents and other teachers.217
Undoubtedly, Professor Rivera is right to say, in her encyclopedic
series of articles,218 that " [e]mployment of gay persons as teachers

in elementary schools and high schools is still a very controversial
issue. " 219
As far as I can determine, experts seem to be divided on the
question of the effect of a known homosexual on elementary and
secondary students, and the reported decisions reflect this battle.

One federal district court, after thoroughly rehearsing the conflict
ing expert testimony, did state that "instruction of a n eighth-grade
earth science class by a known homosexual poses sensitive
problems, both for relationships among students and between stu
dents and parents. "22 0 To date, the Supreme Court has cautiously
avoided getting caught in this swirl, most recently by denying cer2 15. 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (quoting Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake
City School Dist., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143, 146 (C.P. 1967)).
216. 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
217. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, 1342 (en
bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) .
218. Rivera, supra note 153, at 459. Professor Rivera's asterisk following the word

"Queer*" directs us to the dictionary: *"1. Deviating from the expected or normal; strange.

2. Odd or unconventional in behavior; eccentric. 3. Arrousing suspicion. 4. Slang. Homosex

ual." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGAUGE 1070 (W. Morris ed.
1976). See also Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Per
sons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
219.
220.

Rivera, supra note 153, at 514.

Acanfora v. Board of Educ. , Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843, 849 (D. Md.
1973), aff'd , 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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tiorari in Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No . J 0, 22 1 and by re
fusing to review the Sixth Circuit's Mad River decision,222 in

which

Marjorie Rowland was fired as a high school guidance counselor
"because she was a homosexual who revealed her sexual prefer
ence-and, as the jury found, for n o other reason. "223 Justice Bren
nan's dissent from denial of certiorari to the Sixth Circuit

shows

how far appellate judges sometimes wiggle the facts in order to
avoid vexing constitutional issues. Said Justice Brennan:

" [T]hese

maneuvers suggest only a desire to evade the central question: may
a State dismiss a public employee based on her bisexual status
alone? "22•
And what of homosexual instructors at the college level? Ac
cording to the experts, they agree that "at least a t the University
level, it would not be harmful to students , either homosexual or
heterosexual, to be exposed to a homosexual professor who compe
tently performs his duties."226 I should think most people would
remain unperturbed by the prospect of a homosexual lecturer in
the theater department, although President Trabant of the Uni
versity of Delaware was quite miffed when Richard Aumiller got
his name in the papers: "I really don't care what Mr. Aumiller does
in his bedroom, but I consider it an effront [sic] to the University
and to me as an individual that he insists in making his bedroom
activities public information and a point of evangelistic endeavor
to recruit more gays to his supposed cause. "226 The court held
President Trabant civilly liable for $ 10,000 in com p e nsatory dam
ages and for $5,000 punitive damages for violation of lecturer
Aumiller's constitutional right of freedom of expression guaranteed
by the first amendment.227
Of course, freedom of speech is one thing, free association on
campus, quite another. A few years ago the proposed marriage of
two adult male homosexuals, one a university librarian, the other a
law student, created quite a stir on the campus of the University of
Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit upheld the Board of Regents' re221.

434 U.S. 879 ( 1977).

222. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 730 F.2d
444 (6th Cir . 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985).
223. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist . , Montgomery County, Ohio, 105 S. Ct.
1373, 1373 (1985) (quoting 730 F . 2d 444, 454 ( 6th Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., dissenting)).
224. 105 S. C t . at 1375.
225. Aumiller v. University of Del . , 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1291 n. 53 (D. Del. 1977).
226. Id. at 1283.
227. Id. at 1311-12.
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fusal to approve an employment contract with the librarian on the
ground that his "personal conduct, as represented in the public
and University news media, is not consistent with the best interest
of the University."228 The scope of review was narrow; the appel
late judges were quite unwillin g to overrule a determination "fall
ing within the considerable discretion entrusted those charged with
the heavy responsibility of supervising the administration of this
nation's colleges and universities."229 This is the language of judi
cial deference, not judicial activism, although the Eighth Circuit
did caution that "this is not a case involving mere homosexual
propensities on the part of a prospective employee. "230 In other
words, personal status is one thing, personal conduct quite
another.
With this nu tshell behin d us, we are ready for Naragon v.
Wharton. 231 In this case, a constitutional contest arose between
Kristine Naragon, an excellent teacher in the Music School at
LSU-to judge from her record-and Chancellor James Wharton,
who removed Naragon from the classroom and put her into re
search when controversy arose after Naragon had an affair with an
LSU freshman music student.
Naragon lost at trial. On appeal, Judge Reavley reacted suc
cinctly: "Naragon persists. She argues that the real reason for her
change of duties was that she is homosexual, and that denying her
teaching duties for that reason is an Equal Protection violation
and infringes her right to privacy as well as her First Amendment
right of association."232 The district court had found that
Naragon's sexual preferences had nothing to do with the Univer
sity's decision. But, as Judge Reavley responded, " [i]f that be the
fact , we will be required to proceed no further."233
And what did the record show? Naragon was twenty-seven at
the time the freshman music student moved into Naragon's home
and became intimate with her teacher. The student's parents were
quite upset by all this. Shouting matches ensued, and the matter
unfortunately spilled over onto campus where u niversity adminis228. M cConn ell
1046 ( 19 72).
229. Id. a t 196.
230.

v.

Anders on, 45 1 F.2d 193, 194 (8th cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.

Id.

231.

737 F.2d 1403 (5th C ir. 1984).

232.
233.

Id. a t 14 04 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 14 05.
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trators could hardly sit still. Vice Chancellor Hargra ve testified
that there may be (not that there clearly and presen tly is) an ad
verse effect upon the student, the University, and the effectiveness
of the teacher when faculty have affairs with their students. Said
Judge Reavley:
Teachers are role models, good or bad, for students. The Vice -Chan
cellor considered intimacy betw e en a teacher and student a breach
of professional ethics on the part of the tea cher , and thought that it
undermined the proper position and effectiveness of the teacher be
cause of the perc eption of other students. Furthermore, if known,
conduct o f this nature between teac her and student would be dam
aging to relations with the public and parents, both present and
prospective. 284

The language of the court is r estrained: "We would be very reluc
tant to reject the reasoning of these educators or to overrule their
de c i s i o n . " 2 3 11
J udge
Re a v l e y
procee d e d
no
fur ther .
"
36
2
"AFFIRMED.
Two observations support the majority's view. First, even in
California a college teacher can be fired for unzipping a student's
capri pants after class in the back seat of a car , as Stubblefield's237
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1406.
236. Id.
237. Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 823, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320
(1971):
After teaching a class on the night of January 28, 1969, defendant drove a fe
male student, and a member of that class, in his car to a location on a side street near
Compton College and parked. The location is in an area of industrial construction
and was not lighted.
At some time after defendant parked, a Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff
spotted defendant's car. The car appeared to the deputy to be abandoned and he
went to investigate. When the deputy illuminated defendant's car with his headlights
and searchlight, defendant then sat up. When the deputy approached defendant's
car, illuminating the interior with his flashlight, he observed that defendant's pants
were unzipped and lowered from the waist, exposing his penis. The student was nude
from the waist up, and her capri pants were unzipped and open at the waist.
On these facts, the court ventured to suggest that "[i]t would seem that, as a minimum,
responsible conduct upon the part of a teacher, even at the college level, excludes meretri
cious relationships with his students." Id. at 825, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 318. Accord, Goldin v.
Board of Educ. of Central School Dist. No. 1 , 35 N.Y.2d 534, 540, 324 N.E.2d 106, 108, 364
N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (1974) (disciplinary proceedings sustained on charges that a teacher
"slept with an 18-year old female, a member of the 1973 graduating class of said school
district, and a student for whom . . . [the teacher] was a guidance counselor"). The New
York Court of Appeals rejected the teacher's contention that the right of privacy recognized
by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) precludes disciplinary proceedings against
him on these charges. 35 N.Y.2d at 543, 3 2 4 N.E.2d at 110-11, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
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case shows. Second, the Louisiana State University's Faculty
Handbook provides that faculty members are primarily scholars
who strive to learn and teach. "They are counselors, models,
tutors, guides, and defenders of reason and truth. "238 There is not
one word in the book prohibiting the faculty from having sex with
students; however, it does say the faculty "must exercise wisdom
and fairness in dealing with other people, particularly with stu
dents in their charge. "239
Judge Goldberg is on the opposite side of the judicial fence:
"Today's majority, like the trial court below, seemingly dqes not
want to hear the clamoring of the difficult and extremely impor
tant legal issue raised by this case."240 The record, as Judge
Goldberg reads it, points in only one direction: "The record con
tains uncontroverted evidence that the complaints of Ms. Doe's
parents constituted a central factor in the University's decision to
take action."24 1 Moreover, the record clearly indicates that the par
ents opposed their daughter's relationship largely because of its
homosexual aspect. Therefore, Judge Goldberg concludes: "The
University's consideration of pressure from Mr. and Mrs. Doe un
avoidably infects the school's action with the biases of the par
ents. "142 Such action is impermissible under the rule of Palmore v.
Sidoti.243 In Palmore the maj ority held that " [p]rivate biases may
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly give them e:ffect. "2"" The Naragon dissent concludes:

A very simple objection underlies my dissent today. The ma
jority has refused to acknowledge a legal question which I believe is
plainly presented. The extent to which the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits or circumscribes discrimi
nation based upon an individual's sexual preference is a largely un
resolved, yet immensely important legal issue of our day. But the
obvious role of private biases in the University's action does not ring
loudly enough in the majority's ears to attract their attention. I will
not put a maxim silencer on the validated cries of discrimination
and the calls to this Court for constitutional justice. 24�
238.
239.
240.

FACULTY HANDBOOK 4 (Louisiana State University 1985).

Id.

737 F.2d at 1406 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
241. Id.
242 . Id. at 1408.
243. 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
244. Id. at 1882.
245. 737 F.2d at 1408 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) .
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Now this is fine writing from a sensitive judge who over the
years has reached out, as in the Cleburne Living Center2• opinion,
.
to protect nonconforming victims of prejudice and pubhc excite
ment. I have always admired Irving Goldberg's courage as a judge.
He alone wrote to condemn Texas's sodomy statute on the merits
in Baker v . Wade: "If ever there was a constitutional right to pri
vacy, Texas has violated it by blatantly intruding into the private
sex lives of fully consenting adults. "247 However, Jane Doe was a
minor when she entered into her liaison with Ms. Naragon, and
Palmore is a race case, not a case involving homosexual relations
between faculty and student in the university context. In other

�

words, one should not get swept away by cries for constitutional
justice regardless of limiting circumstances. With all respect, Kris
tine Naragon's case is not "the perfect case with the perfect client,
one whose behavior is so exemplary that bigots cannot successfully
raise a pretext to justify discriminatory action. "248 Nevertheless,
others see homophobia in Judge Reavley's majority opinion.249
VI.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND "CREATION
S C I E NCE"

Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and

246.

Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.

1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). See text accompanying notes 119 supra.
247.

769 F.2d at 293 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).

248.

Rivera, supra note 153, at 526 (footnote omitted).

249.

"The appellate decision should be read carefully to note how the choice of words

indicates the underlying homophobia of the writer,'' says Professor Rhonda Rivera in her
critique of the Naragon decision. Rivera, supra note 153, at 498. Professor Rivera sees
homophobia behind several features of the court's decision, viz.:
For example, the Fifth Circuit referred to the "undue influence" that Naragon exer
cised over the student. The phrase is not found in the lower court opinion nor was
any evidence presented that Naragon had any undue influence over the student in
question. The influence could be that mere homosexuality was "undue influence." Do
male teachers who live with and sleep with their female students exercise undue in
fluence? Another interesting word used in the appellate opinion was that Naragon
"controlled Doe's participation" in an interview with the dean of students. Appar

ently, Naragon irritated the court, which commented "Naragon persists" at the be
ginning of the paragraph which ends with the words: "none of the arguments about
Naragon's constitutional rights need be discussed." Later the Fifth Circuit concluded

�

h

"i appeared that Doe was confused and not thinking independently, and the breac
with her parents was a serious problem." Doe was living with Naragon during the
whole trial and continued to do so afterwards. The use of the anonymous title Doe
was not at the student's request, but at the request of her parents.

Id. (footnotes omitted) .
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Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction" is legally dead in
the Fifth Circuit. Ho The statute required the teaching of what is
called "Creation-Science" in Louisiana's public schools whenever
evolution is taught. The Act defines "Creation-Science" as "the
scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific
evidences."2111 The d�strict court struck down the Act holding that
it lacked a legitimate secular purpose and would have the effect of
promoting religion. The appellate court affirmed: "In truth," said
Judges Brown, Politz, and Jolly, "this particular case is a simple
one, subject to a simple disposal: the Act violates the establish
ment clause of the first amendment because the purpose of the
statute is to promote a religious belief."252
Judge Jolly's panel opinion, which strikes me as a calm, law
yer-like job, rests upon the premise that "irrespective of whether it
is fully supported by scientific evidence, the theory of creation is a
religious belief."253 Thus, Louisiana's Act "establishes a religious
belief,"2114 that violated the first prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman. 255

250.

Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985).

LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 17:286.3(2) (West 1982). The full text o f the Act is set forth

251.
in

an

.

appendix to the opinion of the court in Aguillard, 765 F.2d at 1258·59. For

a

sympa

thetic discussion of "creationism, " see Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Ins truction
in Public Schools, 87

YALE L.J. 515 (1978). According to Mr. Bird,

Leading advocates of the creationist perspective do not endeavor to proscribe
discussion of the general theory of evolution, as did the law involved in the Scopes
trial. Nor in most areas do they attempt to introduce biblical creation into public
schools. Instead they support "scientific creationism," a theory of the origin of the
earth and life that employs scientific argument and not a sacred text in its challenge

to the general theory.

Id. at 517. (footnotes omitted). Mr. Bird proposes the neutralizatio n of exclusive instruction

in public schools of the general theory of evolution by offering alongside of Darwin instruc

tion in scientific creationism:
Instruction in scientific creationism, however, would serve to neutralize a public

school course that exclusively presents the general theory of evolution. Spokesmen for
this perspective do not seek to ban Darwin's Origin of Species o r to exclude the gen
eral theory from classrooms. Instea d , their model of scientific creationism proposes
special creation of matter and life , postulates stability of original plant and animal
kinds, denies common ancestry of human beings with apes, and offers catastrophism,
the view that unique and cataclysmic events occurred in the past, as the underlying
principle of geologic history. This perspective suggests that the law of entropy, or
change toward disorder, applies to the earth and living organisms, and that the world
and life came into existence relatively recently. Textbooks presenting scientific crea
tionism do not expound the Bible, but instead employ scientific discussion, and their
authors are highly trained in science.
Id. at 554 -55.
765 F.2d at 1253.

252.
253.

Id.

254.

Id. at 1256.
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Notwithstanding Louisiana's solemn avowal of a secular purpose
for the Act-"protecting academic freedom "2G 6- the panel judges
otherwise . " [T]he Act continues the battle William Je n n ings Bryan
carried to his grave. The Act's intended effect is to di scr edit evolu
tion by c ounterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teach
ing of creationism, a religious belief. The statute the r efo re is a law
respecting a particular religious belief. "2 G7 An d the pa n el keeps its
eyes open: "Our decision is not made in a vacuum, nor do we write
on a clean slate. We must recognize that the theory of c reation is a
religious belief. We cannot divorce ourselves from the historical
fact that the controversy between the proponents o f evo lu tion and
creationism has religious overtones. "2 G8 According to the panel's
perception, the statute teaches religion in the public schools, never
mind the rubric "science, " and therefore the Balanced Treatment
Act is, on its face, "inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom
9
as it is universally understood. "2G
Louisiana's suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied, but
only by the thinnest margin possible, eight to seven. 260 Judge Gee's
dissent is stinging:

[T]he Louisiana statute requires no more than that neither theory
about the origins of life and matter be misrepresented as fact, and
that if scientific evidence supporting either view of how these things
came about be presented in public schools, that supporting the other
must be-so that within the r easonable limits of the curriculum, the
subject of origins will be discussed in a balanced manner if it is dis
cussed at all. I see nothing illiberal about such a requirement, nor
can I imagine that Galileo or Einstein would have found fault with
it. Indeed, so far as I am aware even Ms. O'Hair has never asked for
more than equal time.261
255. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) presented the following tripartite test: (1) the statute
.
question must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must
.
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not foster "an excessive gov
ernment entanglement with religion." The Fifth Circuit's decision is limited to the "purpose
prong" of the Lemon test: "Our decision today requires only that we consider the purpose
prong of the Lemon test, for as the Supreme Court recently expressed, '[N)o consideration
of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular pur
pose.' " 765 F.2d at 1255 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 (1985)).
256. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §. 17:286.1 (West 1982) ("This Subpart is enacted for the
purposes of protecting academic freedom .").
257. 765 F.2d at 1 257.
258. Id. at 1256 (footnote omitted) .
259. Id. at 1257.
260. 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985).
261. Id. at 226-27 (Gee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
.

m
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According to Judge Gee, the panel is all wrong to rely on its "vis
ceral knowledge regarding what must have m otivated the legisla
tors. It sifts their hearts and minds, divines their motive for requir
ing that truth be taught, and strikes down the law that requires it.
This approach effectually makes a farce of the judicial exercise of
discerning legislative intent."262 Furthermore, the dissent objects
to denying Louisiana a chance to defend its statute at trial since
record affidavits from highly qualified scientists affirmed that
evolution is not an established fact and that there is strong evi
dence that life and the universe came about in a different manner.
"At the least, these affidavits make a fact issue that those proposi
tions are true. For purposes of reviewing the summary judgment
which our panel's opinion affirms, then, the propositions stated
must be taken as established: there are two bona fide views. "263
Judge Gee concludes: "I should have thought that requiring the
truth to be taught on any subject displayed its own secular war
rant, one at the heart of the scientific method itself. "264
It is probable that the approach of Wallace v. Jaffree266 to Al
abama's "Moment of Silence" law is enough to condemn Louisi
ana's statute-if its purpose is what the panel says it is. Neverthe
less, it is disturbing that Louisiana was denied an opportunity to
go to trial over its law.266
Perhaps the majority believed that a trial on the merits would
only make Louisiana look foolish. For the moment, Judge Jolly has
had the last word:

First, as writer of the panel opinion, I offer my apologies to the
majority of this court for aligning it with the forces of darkness and
anti-truth. Second, I do not personally align myself with the dissent
ers in their commitment to the search for eternal truth through
state edicts. Third, I commend to the dissenters a serious rereading
of the majority opinion that they may recognize the hyperbole of the
262.

Id. at 227.

263. Id. at 226 (emphasis by Judge Gee).
264. Id. at 228.
265. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's find
ing that the one-minute period of silence in all public schools was unconstitutional.).
266. In the Arkansas case, McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D.
Ark. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983), Arkansas's "Balanced Treatment for Creation
Science and Evolution-Science Act" was declared unconstitutional as violative of the estab
lishment clause, but this ruling followed a trial on the merits; the State was not shut out of
court on summary judgment. One wonders why Louisian a was denied its day in court when
Arkansas got one.
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opmwn in which they join. And , finally, I respectfully s�bmit, t e
panel opinion speaks for itself, modestly and moderately, 1f one will
allow its words to be carefully heard.267

Louisiana's Attorney General will appeal to the Supreme
Court. 2ss T his decision means the Justices will have to read our
Circuit's competing opinions with an eye to s u bstance, that is,
through the lens of the Establishment Clause.
VII.

" [U]ntying

little

MIS CELLANEOUS KNOTS

knots

n ever

seems

drudgery, "269 Holmes

wrote to Dr. Wu in one of their le tters. The j u dges of the Fifth
Circuit appear to enjoy untying the miscellaneous l e gal knots of
the docket.
For example, Mr. Hill's case from Houston210 matches Judges
Rubin and Higginbotham in a n unravelling of the overbreadth doc
triµe of Broadrick v. Oklahoma. 2 11 Here is Houston's ordinance in
question:
Sec. 34- 1 1. Assaulting or inter[ering with policemen. (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose,
molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his
duty, or any person summone d to aid in making an arrest.272
267. Aguillard, 778 F.2d at 228 (Jolly, J., responding to dissent). Judge Jolly's insist
ing on the last word by publishing a response to Judge Gee's dissent is unusual, although
not unprecedented in the reports. Compare Judge Bork's published response to his dissen
tiant District of Columbia Circuit colleagues in Dronenberg v. Zeck, 746 F.2d 1579, 1582 ·84
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying rehearing en bane).
268. In his press release announcing the appeal, Attorney General William J. Guste,
Jr., said that Judge Gee's dissent was the most forceful he had read in his tenure as Attor
ney General. He added that the dissent, joined in by seven judges, was a clear invitation to
seek review of this controversial case b y the Supreme Court of the United States. Office of
the Attorney General, State of Louisiana, Department of Justice, Press Release, Dec. 23,
1985, at 1. "With the court divided eight to seven, I feel an obligation to bring this matter
before the Supreme Court of the United States for its decision," Guste concluded. Id. at 5.
269. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to John C.H. Wu, Sept. 20, 1923, reproduced in Jus
TICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: Hrs BooK NoTICE AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS,
Pt 3, Chapter Heading Recent Letters to Dr. Wu 167 (H.C. Shriver ed. 1936). Dr. Wu
(1899-1986) was formerly Judge of the Shanghai Provisional Court, Principal of the Com
parative Law School of China, and Member of the Law Codification Commission. Id. at 151
n.1. The Holmes-Wu correspondence began in 1921 when Wu was a student at Michigan
Law School and Holmes was on the Supreme Court in Washington. Their letters are a lost
treasure on the shelf of the law library.
270. Hill v. City of Houston, Tex., 764 F.2d 1 156 (5th Cir. 1985).
271. 413 U.S. 601 ( 1973).
272. 764 F.2d at 1158.
.
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At first glance this law may appear perfectly sensible. The ordi

nance states "or in any manner oppose," a fairly broad meaning
that obviously involves speech, possibly protected speech. Here is a
sample of Judge Rubin's thinking for the majority:
The conduct literally proscribed by the ordinance includes
much that is completely lawful. The dictionary defines "oppose," for
example, to include, "to stand in the way of; hinder or obstruct," "to
have an adverse

opinion concerning"

or

"to offer arguments

against." . . . Applying these definitions to the second clause of the
ordinance, it is clear that the statute affects a broad range of pro
tected activities. If a mother pleads with a policeman to "spare my
baby" while the policeman arrests her son in front of their home,
she has "opposed" the policeman in the execution of his duties
In short, the second clause of Section 32- ll(a) encompasses
mere verbal as well as physical conduct . . . . The areas of protected
conduct encompassed by the ordinance are more than niere "margi
nal applications in which the statute would infringe on First
Amendment values." They comprise a substantial range of protected
speech and verbal communications that might be deterred by the
present wording of the statute.273

Down went Houston's ordinance, notwithstanding Broadrick v.
Oklahoma 's admonition that the overbreadth doctrine is " mani
festly strong medicine" which should be applied "sparingly" and
"only as a last resort. "27•
In his dissent, Judge Higginbotham would construe the ordi
nance "to proscribe only speech which is not made with a bona fide
intention to exercise a constitutional right, but solely with the in
tention of interfering with police officers who are attempting to
carry out lawful police functions, and which actually does create
such interference."276 The dissent would apply Broadrick's require
ment of substantial overbreadth more stringently: "The require
ment of substantiality accommodates our constitutional devotion
to the decision of concrete cases, as well as our devotion to separa
tion of powers and federalism,"278 says Judge Higginbotham. "A
diluted substantiality requirement expresses a perceived primacy
of First Amendment values over Article III checks of judicial
power and defined judicial roles, and in doing so, eschews what I
273.
274.
275.
276.

764 F.2d at 1163-64 (footnotes omitted).
413 U.S. at 613.
764 F.2d at 1172 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

Id.
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see to be a fundamental analytical tool of constitutional adjudica
tion-that of s tructural inference, text and history . "2 11
Given Co lten u. Kentucky,218 I should think Judge H igginbot
ham has the better of the argument, although the q uestion is close.
Doubtless the majority and dissenting opinions in Hill u.

City of

Houston would make fine reading in a first amendment seminar,
and when the case is reargue d en bane before the full Fifth Circuit,

as it will be, 2 79 the professor would do well to adjourn class to
Camp Street where the books connect with life . 280

Tarrant County Hospital Distric t281 is our second
miscellaneous knot. This one d ivides Judges Rubin and Goldberg,
Stern

v.

a challenging split, with Chief Judge Clark concurring in the mid
dle. The case involves the old problem of discrimination against
osteopathic physicians, in favor of allopathic healers, with a new
Texas twist. Under current Texas law, state agencies are forbidden
to differentiate among physi cians solely on the basis of their aca
demic medical degrees. 282 In earlier days, the Supreme Court sus
tained such discrimination, holding in Hayman

u.

City of Galues

ton283 that a hospital's decision to exclude osteopaths was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable because it was based on the necessity of
choosing between competing modes of treatment. This was 1927,
although as recently as 1979, in Berman v. Florida Medical
Center, Inc.,28" the Fifth Circuit followed Hayman in dictum, opin
ing that a public hospital may deny staff privileges to a physician
simply because he is an osteopathic doctor.
277.

Id.

278.

407 U.S. 104 (1972).

279.

Rehearing en bane granted, 764 F.2d 1 156 (5th Cir. 1985).

280.

The challenge of connecting the books with life is perennial in legal education.

Long ago Frederick Pollock said of his classes in a letter to Holmes, "Both from my own
experience and from information I believe students' main trouble is to make out the connex
ion of the book-law they are examined i n with the live business of the Courts." Frederick

Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Feb. 1 1 , 1924, in 2 HOLMES- POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF Mk JUSTICE HOLMES

AND

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874- 1932, at 127

(M.D. Howe ed. 1941). Holmes answered Pollock's letter saying: "I quite understand the

difficulties of connecting the books with life. I remember a chap who had just left the Law
School writing to another that he had seen a real writ (or deed, I forget)." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock, March 7, 1924, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETI'ERS at 128.
281. 755 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1985). Different results were reached on rehearing en bane.
778 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1985).
282.
'

Texas Medical Practice Act, TEx. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, Subchapter A,

1.02(9) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
283. 273 U.S. 414 ( 1�27).
284.

600 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Given these rulings, one would not expect Dr. Stern to win his
constitutional case in federal court, but win he did-and on state
statutory grounds judicially elevated into a federal equal protec
tion violation. According to Judge Rubin: "state agency's discrimi
natory action when state law commands equality is a patent denial
of [federal] equal protection to those denied equality."285

this holding is perplexing. State statutory protection is
one thing; federal equal protection is another. It is important to
keep these theoretical canvasses hanging separately. As Judge
Goldberg points out in dissent:
Now

[T]his is a novel theory of equal protection, without support i n our
precedents. Previously, I had thought that a violation of state law
was a violation of state law; I had not realized that it could also give
rise to a violation of federal equal protection. Although I believe
that I have always been a stout and ardent defender of equal protec
tion, I fail to see how state law can provide the basis of a federal
equal protection claim.288

A majority of the judges in active service have voted in favor of
granting a .rehearing en banc287 so that the full Fifth Circuit will
285. 755 F.2d at 432.
286. Id. at 437 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Judge Goldberg continued:
While I have little sympathy with efforts to restrict a litigant's access to federal
courts where federal rights are involved, I believe, in contrast to the majority, that
infringements on rights created by state law are best left to state courts. This conclu
sion is far more compatible than the majority's with the principles of federalism that
underlie many of our basic constitutional doctrines, including the doctrines that state
court determinations o f state law are final, and that federal courts should refrain
from exercising jurisdiction in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration
by a state of its own affairs . . . . Although the majority's theory could be defended
in terms of "keeping the states honest," I believe that the enforcement of state law is
a matter primarily of concern to the states. Ultimately, I believe that the majority's
theory trivializes equal protection by shifting attention away from its primary func
tion: imposing substantive restrictions on the ways in which government can govern.
Id. at 440-41 (footnotes o mitted; emphasis in original) .
287. 755 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g en bane granted. Editor's note: On rehearing
en bane, the full Fifth Circuit, by a vote of 10 to 5, rejected the panel's per se equal protec
tion analysis and reversed the district court's conclusion of unconstitutionality. Judge Hig
ginbotham's majority opinion noted:
The guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, its requirement that state laws be ap
plied in the same way to those entitled to equal treatment and its promise of protec
tion from arbitrary or irrational state action, are guarantees that turn on federal con
stitutional standards of equality and rationality rather than on state standards.
Converting alleged violations of state law into federal equal protection and due pro
cess claims improperly bootstraps state law into the Constitution. In doing so, this
novel approach would expand the scope of the fourteenth amendment, would render
its meaning less certain, and would serve no legitimate policy.
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have to untie this knot as well. Regardless of the outcome, here are
judges plainly enjoying their work.
A CENTENNIAL FAREWELL: WHAT IS A LA WYER,

VIII.

WHY BE

ONE?

I want to conclude with a centennial word from Justice Black
directed to lawyers who read these pages.
Hugo Black loved his copy o f Tacitus288 just a s he loved "that
little book of the Constitution " he always carried in his pocket.289
The Judge made his own index by writing notes to himself on the
back pages of the book. "What is a lawyer, why be one?-394" is
one such entry, and if you turn to page 394 you fi n d what Tacitus,
the Roman lawyer and historian, said about our p rofession 2,000
years ago. The passage caught Hugo Black's eye:
Can we possibly be employed to better purpose, than in the exercise

of an art which enables a man, upon all occasions, to support the
interest of his friend, to protect the rights of the stranger, to defend
the cause of the injured, to strike with terror and dismay his open
and secret adversaries, himself secure the while, and guard ed , as it

Stern v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane). Judge
Rubin, joined by Chief Judge Clark, and Judges Politz, Tate, and Johnson, dissented: "I
suggest that it is per se not only unlawful, but arbitrary and capricious, hence not rational,

for a state agency intentionally to create a discriminatory classification forbidden by a valid
state law." Id. at 1065. Judge Rubin's dissent concluded:
The fourteenth amendment forbids the state and its agencies to discriminate
against any class of persons. It is a b ulwark against prejudice, against state action
that condemns without rational basis. The clause was adopted to assure not only that
states enact nondiscriminatory laws but also that they administer state law equally
and fairly. The majority opinion refuses to apply the literal mandate of the Constitu
tion and ignores the history that led t o its enactment. It condones the bigotry of an
allopathic-dominated state hospital district that refuses to be bothered by either the
state law, the federal constitution, or the facts.
Id. at 1067.

288.

II THE WORKS OF

TACITUS (Oxford Trans., rev., New York 1869).

289.

During his 1968 CBS television interview, Justice Black and the Bill of Rights,
the first ever with a sitting Justice, the Justice was asked why he always carried "that little
book of the Constitution" in his pocket. According to Mrs. Black, who witnessed the inter
view being made,
[t]he question lighted up Hugo's face with another of those smiles that endeared
him to just about everyone. Hugo had a confession to make and he didn't mind mak
ing it before millions: "Because I don't know it by heart. I can't-my memory is not
that good. When I say something about it, I want to quote it precisely. And so I
-

usually carry it in my pocket."

E. Black, Hugo Black: A Memorial Protrait, 1982 Y.B. SuP. CT.

HIST. Soc'v 72,

78.
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were, by an imperishable potency?290

At this point, Justice Black substituted his own word in the margin
for the word "potency," rendering the last line "secure the while,
and guarded, as it were, by an imperishable integrity."

290. A Dialogue Concerning Oratory, in II THE WORKS OF TACITUS 394 (Oxford
Trans., rev., New York 1869).

